# A MISCELLANY OF DIVERS Problems.

Containing ingenuous Solutions of sundry Questions, partly Moral, partly of other subjects.

Translated out of French by *HENRY SOME*, M. A. late Fellow of the *Kings Colledge* in *Cambridge*.

LONDON,
Printed for *Charles Adams*, and are to be sold at his shop at the sign of the Talbot, near St. *Dunstans* Church in Fleet-street.
*Anno Dom.* 1662.

721.a.21

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

# *To the vertuous Ladies, Mris* Elizabeth Chaſe, *Mris* Frances Heywood, *and Mris* Lætitia Briggs, *the three ſiſters of his dear friend Mr.* H. Some.

---

*Vertuous Ladies,*

WHereas *common and low ſpirits*, might ſuſpect this action, as a

deſign to renew a paſt ſorrow, ſeeing me, after a year of mourning, recall the memory of ſo ſad a loſs: I know, *your more generous ſouls*, will rather interpret my intent, an endeavour to allay your too long grief, when I revive the memory of a *dear dead Brother*: Since your reaſon, being ſo near of kind to his, cannot but judge it a weakneſs, to preferr the *paſſion* of an *uſeleſs ſorrow*, above the *merit* of a *pious gratitude*.

And

And yet conſidering, that others will be ſo partial, as to blame, whatever their fancies do not approve: I muſt forbear to heighten the cauſe of ſadneſs, by recounting the particulars of your loſs; only I would fain begg your leaves, to acquaint the world, that in *this* they and you are partners. But how ſhall I effect that? ſince experience hath now taught the vulgar, what was formerly reſerved to the knowledge

of the more prudent; That the commendation of our friend is frequently but the cloak of a ſelf-conceited folly: And the world having been of late ſo much abuſed by hypocriſie, is now become ſuſpicious even of vertue, if once recommended; eſpecially by a perſon, whoſe obſcurity leaves him lyable to their cenſure. However the love of goodneſs, the obligation of friendſhip, and conſciouſneſs of truth, ſhall

ſhall prevail with me to the hazard of repute.

I ſhould indeed, both betray an high folly in my ſelf, and injure the worth of my Friend, ſhould I, conſidering my own diſability, undertake to diſcourſe at large of all his merits; and yet thus much I cannot but ſay, his ingenuous diſcourſe, his modeſt deportment, his humility and candour, gained a more then or-

dinary reſpect from all that ever he converſed with, and this they ſhall witneſs for me: They that had the happy opportunity of knowing him more throughly, found his Learning ſo great, and communicated with that freeneſs, his piety ſo true, and practiſed with that innocence, that they could not but love him with admiration, which alſo increaſed in thoſe that had a more ſpecial and

conſtant

conſtant intimacy with him; for ſuch knew him ſo paſsionate a Lover of all ingenuous Learning, that he ever counted that hour loſt, which was not imployed in ſome kind or other of it. He hated naught ſo much as idleneſs, or doing nothing, and that made his very recreations, as ſerious as others ſtudies. And this gave him the advantage of being skilled in modern languages: which although he attained unto,

by

by a sagacity proper to his disposition, and his own industry, yet his courtesie would afterwards entertain discourse with the common Tutors and professed Teachers of them upon all emergent occasions. This his true love to Learning, gave our Nation the opportunity of knowing the Nature and Constitution of the new Famous French Academy, by his translation of their History, written by *Monsieur P. Pellison*; which

was

was a thing so acceptable to the Author, that he was pleased to write him a particular acknowledgement, and communicate to him also this present *Treatise*, which likewise at times of divertisement he taught to speak English: In the perusal of which, I doubt not but the more ingenuous will reap satisfaction, and find sufficient cause to love the *Translators* memory, if they consider that it is not offered as a part of his

more

more ſolid labours, but as a valuable Eſſay of wit, and to be uſed as it was made, only in a Diverſion.

That which I offer to you, *worthy Ladies*, I give not as *a Preſent*, but repay *as a due*, which without injuſtice I cannot detain; a greater reaſon, then that which engageth me to a publication, entituling you to the right of Patronage: For the memory of a dear friendſhip cannot herein challenge

challenge any thing from me, but what the intereſt of a nearer relation makes entirely yours, and together with it, the Devoirs of

Your moſt humble

*Cambridge,*
*Jan.* 10.
1661.

ſervant,

*Samuel Thoms.*



# TO THE READER.

*Reader*,

I Conceive it would be rather presumption in me than humility, if before you come to read what I here present you, I should not give an account of some things that respect

ſpect my deſign, and the manner of theſe *Problems*, which may occaſion you either to bear with their faults, or to condemn them with the more reaſon and juſtice. In the firſt place, ſeeing me alledge commonly many ſeveral reaſons of the Queſtions I handle, you may poſſibly deſire to know, Whether I propound part of them to exerciſe my wit, and to beautifie my work, like an Oratour, that ſaies not only all he believes to be true, or like truth, but alſo all that he thinks advantagious to his cauſe. To this, Reader, let me tell you, that in ſome places indeed, the obſcurity of my matter hath given me licence to make bold conjectures, and ſuch as ſeem-

ed

ed to me more likely to add Beauty than Light to my work: But that these places are very rare; and that everywhere else I have laboured to give only solid reasons, and have alledged many of them, because having considered my matter many wayes, and at several distances, I thought they might be all true. Some indeed may here say, that it is not very likely that one and the same effect should have such different causes, for commonly when we think we have found one solid cause of an effect, this makes us despise all others, and we are apt for this reason to esteem them vain and frivilous. But, Reader, I am not of this judgement, nay on the contra-

ry,

ry do think, that when we discourse upon an effect, we should scarce ever content our selves with *one* good and true cause of it alone, because every considerable effect hath *many* causes which contribute to its grandeur, as all Rivers are formed by the uniting of several brooks, and many petty rivulets. This is very evident of its self in some kind of things; as for example, That which casts a man into a disease, cannot be alwayes one sole cause, but many causes united; so when the Question is to discourse of the ruine of a State, it is clear, that it will never be sufficient to think of finding one solid reason only, because it alwayes hath many. But though

though I see my self confined within the bounds of a Preface, which I am afraid to exceed too much; yet I will in some sort shew you, as much as the brevity which I study will suffer me, that this is no less true in regard of our *Passions, Actions and Humours*, which are the matters the greatest part of this book is composed of. First, for our Actions, and the particular and ordinary motions of our mind, I may say that all our Passions do there appear together alwayes, and act their parts there, though it be not alwayes after the same fashion: just as in each Comedy that is acted, they are the same Actors that appear upon the Stage, though they do not there

there represent the same persons. And as they say that no Element ever appears to us in its purity, that is entirely separated from others, and void of all mixtures; I conceive also that after the very same manner, not one of our ordinary Passions, which are as it were the Ptinciples and Elements of our manners, doth ever appear in its purity, and without some mixture of the others: so that by this means it scarce ever happens, that it is only one spring which moves and actuates our spirits. It would be as long as it is easie to prove this by abundance of examples; but I shall content my self to alledge some of them. If it be demanded,

*Why*

*Why we desire glory?* It is, without question, (to give one solid reason of it) because we look upon it as a second Life, and that we think our Being is amplified and extended according as our renown spreads very far, and as we are known to many men; but for all this, if there be not another cause given, we shall not very well satisfie this demand: For it is very evident, that we desire it also, because the good opinion that others have of our excellency, fortifies and upholds the opinion which we have of it our selves. Besides, we do without doubt desire to gain Esteem, because it is a way to make us be beloved, and that we

we desire to be beloved; nay farther we wish it, both for its own sake (because there is a natural sweetness in being beloved, and that none of the least) and for the conveniences that come by it. Even so too, if a man enquires, *Why we revenge our selves?* he will presently find that we do it for divers several causes, which come from different respects. For it is partly because pretending that the injury received hath cast us down, we labour to raise our selves up again, by making him repent that did it. And partly, we do not desire only to make him repent, but we think also that we discharge our selves in some sort of the hurt we received

ceived from him, in making him ſuffer as much. As we ſee that children think to free themſelves of a kiſs which one hath given them by force, in re-kiſſing him from whom they have received it, and ſay they will give it back to be rid of it themſelves. Partly alſo, (without having any regard to the thing in its ſelf) we revenge our ſelves for the opinion of others, and for fear one ſhould come to think that we had not power or credit enough to do it: Beſides this, we do it out of Fear for the future, and to the end that he which hath offended us, may not preſume to do ſo any more; (For though this be not formally the deſire of Revenge, certain it is that

it alwayes contributes thereunto :) And lastly, we revenge our selves, because that, as the shaking of Fear ceases not so soon as the danger is over; so the hurt we received, hath left in us a blind impression of hatred which lasts still after that is past, and hath only its self for the reason of its self. If we should now examine the motion of the soul in *Love*, we should find in it a stranger mixture of all sorts of Causes, Natural and Moral, Corporal and Spiritual. In a word, we should as easily find that it is the same with all the other ordinary and extraordinary humours of our minds; I mean, that there is not any of them that hath one

only ſource, and that they have alwayes many roots, ſome whereof look backward, and ſome forward, ſome to the right hand, others to the left; nay we ſhould find they have almoſt alwayes quite contrary cauſes, ſince that moſt commonly they come to us partly from ſtrength and partly from weakneſs, partly from reaſon and partly from blindneſs; and that they almoſt alwayes ſhew both ſome perfection and ſome imperfection both at once.

Behold, Reader, the firſt thing I was to ſpeak to you of, upon which I have, it may be, inſiſted too long. Paſs we now to that which remains with all poſſible brevity. Some of my friends, whoſe leaſt advice

weighs much with me, counselled me not to forget in several places of this Book, some reasons that are commonly given upon the Questions I here handle, for fear least I seem to be ignorant of them. But I told them that this might breed in you a great dislike; and that besides, though those causes which are vulgarly given of divers Questions, are many times very good, yet are they more often superficial, or at least not the principal; and this in my opinion proceeds from hence, that the vulgar hath the common sense much better than its understanding; and that by this means it sees indeed well enough with a single eye the things that touch the common

common ſenſe, but is much leſs able to give the reaſons of them, or diſcovers ordinarily only the ſhalloweſt. This I told them for mine own juſtification; and after they had heard me, they believed it was ſufficient that I alledge theſe vulgar reaſons, when it is altogether neceſſary to do ſo, and that I ſhould here acquaint you, that I have ſlighted many others, or for fear of rendring my ſelf tedious, I would not alledge them all.

Moreover, I have formed the moſt part of theſe *Problems* in a very conciſe and ſuccinct manner, and by way of Queſtion, in imitation of ſeveral antient Philoſophers; and that I might comprehend

the more things in fewer words. But because a concise and succinct reason, which strikes the mind suddainly, seems at first to be more acute and gentle, than solid and profound; and because I know that people judge often enough of things, as of men, by their countenance and habit: I was not willing to tie my self alwayes to this method, and have many times vented my reasons after a more Dogmatical and positive manner, and made my discourse a little more diffuse. Nevertheless, I hope that in judging the whole work in gross, you will acknowledge to me that I could not have allowed less room to these meditations which I here offer you, and that I had not a

design

design to make you lose in the reading of my book any considerable part of your time, which you ought to imploy better otherwise.

These are the three things, Reader, which I desired to speak to you of; However I do not pretend, by telling you what I have endeavoured to do, to prejudice you in favour of me; I say only that I have endeavoured, and not that I have performed any thing: and on the contrary, to take from you all preoccupation, and to leave your judgement the more free, let me tell you, in putting a period to this discourse, that I my self am not satisfied, whether I have conceived my reasons with sufficient strength, whether I

have explained them with grace and clearneſs enough; whether my ſtile be hard or pleaſant; and that I demand your judgement: Nay I declare unto you, that I doubt not but there are many faults in this my book; and that thoſe that ſhall think ſo, will be of my opinion. And if ſtill others ſay, that there are more faults than perfections in it, and that I have done nothing which deſerves that you ſhould read and approve it: I ſhall not reply any thing more harſh and ſharp, then that this may very eaſily be, ſince that my ſpirit is ſo imperfect, and that I am not certain they are in the wrong.

And if you demand, what it is that hath given me the confidence to expoſe to your view

this

this work which I present, notwithstanding the diffidence I have of my own abilities; I shall answer, that it is on the one side a certain Goodness and Complacency which some persons Illustrious for their worth, and such as I am sure you know and reverence, have had for it; and on the other side, the extream desire which I had to do somewhat that might be profitable to you; for it is certainly, Reader, this desire, more than love of glory, or any hope that I could have conceived to see any success proceed from my labours that might be advantagious to me, that hath sweetened whatsoever it could have of pains or trouble in it; and I hope, that if you make

any reckoning of these Philosophical reflections, wherein I have mingled light matters with important, I may perhaps one day offer you some others upon higher subjects, from whence you may receive much more profit.

---

On

# On the judicious Translator Master *Henry Some* late of Ks. Colledge Fellow, my dear and deceased Friend.

WHat *Problems* Aristotle *never told*,
*Nor* Plutarch, *nor this* Oedipus *unfold*,

*Resolve*.

*Resolve who can: wherefore im-*
*partial Fate*
*Of usefull mens short life contracts*
*the date?*

*Whence your small Pox more unre-*
*lenting are*
*Towards the High, the Learned*
*and the Fair?*

*Why fell such loyal expectations*
*short*
*Of your so near, and so long wish'd*
*for Port?*

*Why should a candid, studious,*
*peacefull mind*
*Scarce through this angry Age*
*safe passage finde?*

*But stay, bold Muse; None may*
*without offence*

*Fathom*

*Fathom the Depths of State and Providence.*
*Reſt we content what Nature hath reveald*
*To read, and leave thoſe other volumes ſeald.*

*Our Joy, our Sorrow with*
*(a) diſtinguiſh'd tears;* (a) Prob. 4, 5.
*Our (b) Laughter at this* (b) 47.
*Authors Bar appears;*
*Who doth to ſolid Reaſon reconcile*
*Ev'ry (c) almoſt involuntary ſmile.* (c) 28.
*The ſpring of Paſſions, and the quick Debate*
*Of Actions ſeeming indeliberate,*
*Are here diſclos'd: his Clue does guide your mind*
*Her ſelf through her own Labyrinths to wind.*

Now

(d) 51. *Now we diſcern,* (d) *Why*
*the parch'd ears grow white,*
*When your hot Conſtellations*
*unite:*

*We more then feel what*
(e) 7. (e) *ſtreightned Eaſt-*
*winds blow:*
(f) 39. (f) *The Serick Inſect we*
*admire and know:*

(g) 12. *I know too* (g) *Whence my*
*friend who did but aim*
*At doing well, hath hit the mark*
*of Fame.*

*Yet unreſolv'd of what one Page*
*pretends,*
(h) 6. (h) *That men not beſt may*
*make your ſureſt friends,*
*His life retracts that; and againſt*
*pretence*

*Of*

*Of Demonſtration brings full evidence.*
*Like diſpoſitions ſtrong affections move:*
*None worſe then He, can challenge equal love.*

Jan. 2. 1661.

*Chriſtopher Ware*

Maſter of the Free-School of *Tunbridge.*

To.

## *To my Worthy Friend Mr.* Samuel Thoms *Publiſher of this work of our Deceaſed Friend the Tranſlator Mr.* Henry Some.

SOme do aſperſe *Tranſlations*, ſay they be
Like *reverſt Arras* rugged Imag'rie.
If ſo, wee'r well by this example taught
'Tis the *Tranſlators*, not *Tranſlations* fault.

*SOME*

*SOME* could out-do his author, lend his ſtory
A *borrow'd*, greater then its *native* glory;
Not like thoſe Scriblers, as ill taught as fed,
Who turn books not int' other tongues, but bread.
He knew as well to *write*, as to *Tranſlate*;
To *lend*, as *borrow* learning; nor ingrate
To forraign witts, could, as well ſtockt as they,
His *Paris* bills in *Cambridge* coyn repay.
Nay he was an *Original* of *Wit*
So fair, ſo worthy, *Heaven Tranſlated* it.

But can I name our loſs, nor pay his Herſe
The tributary duty of a Verſe?

A duty,

A duty, though ſuperfluous, ſince he
Was to himſelf ſufficient Elegie.
Should we his *Learning, Vertue, Candor* ſcan,
Thoſe joynt *Perfections* ſpeak him more then *Man.*
Dear Sir! when I recall thoſe Attick nights
We once enjoy'd with him, thoſe loſt delights;
When his diſcourſe charmd our attentive ears,
And ſwell'd us then with joy, as now with *tears*,
When we could call his learn'd diverſions ours,
With which he us'd to wing the ſlow-pac'd hours;
Methinks ſtern grief doth all my ſence engroſs,
And the remembrance duplicates our loſs.

But

But Sir 'tis you alone muſt now re-
trive
This loſs, and in his writings make
him live.
Then as (while he lyes low in ſilent
earth)
You've given this *Poſthume off-ſpring*
happy birth;
So ſtill, *Lucina* like, propitious
be,
And 's *other labours* from abortion
free.
Raiſe him a *monument* laſting as
*Fame*,
And let as *Trophies* of his living
Name,
His *learned reliques*, while his aſhes
burn,
Riſe like the *Phœnix* from their *Pa-
rents* Urne.

Then when his happy labours ſhall
be grown
Old in eſteem, enrich us with your
own.

So

So ſhall your name with his enrolled
ſtand,
And both in Honours train walk
hand in hand.

R. S. *Late Fellow of*
*Kings Colledge.*

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Upon

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## Upon the untimely death of his moſt Ingenious and Learned Friend Mr. *Henry Some*, the Tranſlator of this Book.

*SUrely in Nature, there's ſome reaſon, Why*
*The beſt of Spirits do the ſooneſt Dy.*
*Brisk wits, it ſeems, are like the pureſt fire,*
*Which brighteſt burns, but ſooneſt does expire.*
*The overleaven'd ſort of men, we ſee*
*Aged and loathed like the Raven bee:*
*Whilſt the more ſprightly part, like fragrant Roſe*
*Lov'd and long-liv'd in death their eyelids cloſe:*
*The Learned Planet courtier to the Sun,*
*As ſwift as Poſt his ſtated race doth run:*
*Whilſt*

*Whilſt his dull brother, with his leaden face,*
*Ends not his courſe, in twice ten times the ſpace:*
*Ah me! it grieves me, that the ripeſt wit,*
*Should fatal prove, to him that owneth it:*
*This kild my Friend: from henceforth be't a ſhame*
*To be long-liv'd, for years your wit will blame.*

*J. Jones* fellow of the Kings Colledge in *Cambridge.*

# A Table of the Chapters contained in this Volume.


PROB. 1.

*What is the reaſon that the addreſs and ſubtilty of wit which appears in the execution of an evil action, makes us think it ſometimes more ugly, and ſometimes leſs?* pag. 1

PROB. 2.

*Whence comes the cuſtom of making fire-works and ſhooting off Guns, either when a Peace is made, or after a Victory, or at the entrance of Princes into ſome City, or upon other*

*other the like occasions?* 4

PROB. 3.

*Whence is it that the Choler of him that hath no cause to be afraid of us, and hath our necks under his foot, is sometimes sooner appeased by bravadoes and boldness, then by humility and entreaties?* 9

PROB. 4.

*Whence comes it that Fears are a comfort to sadness, and how they are formed?* 13

PROB. 5.

*What is the reason there are Tears of Joy?* 16

PROB. 6.

*Whence comes it that many very wicked men are often times the best friends?* 20

PROB.

PROB. 7.

*What is the reason that the Wind which comes in at a window, or a little hole, is more dangerous than that which we feel abroad in the open field?* 25

PROB. 8.

*Whence comes it that Evil is more active then good?* 28

PROB. 9.

*What is the reason that Water-drinkers are greater lovers of fruit than others?* 31

PROB. 10.

*What is the reason that there is no such enmity as that which succeeds amity?* 33

PROB. 11.

*Why hath extream affliction no Tears?* 36

PROB. 12.

*What is the reason that some things are gotten best by neglecting them?* 41

PROB. 13.

*What is the reason that those things which we are accustomed to, are not prejudicial to our health?* 44

PROB. 14.

*Whence comes it, that (as it is the saying of some body) a great service is not so proper to gain our affections, as many petty services done in a continued series, and on all occasions?* 49

PROB. 15.

*What is the reason that a great joy makes us facile to pardon injuries?* 53

PROB. 16.

*What is the reason there is so much false news spread abroad, and that many delight to make others believe strange things?* 60

PROB. 17.

*What is the reason that having been long on horse-back, a man doth better refresh himself by walking a little on foot, then by sitting still?* 63

PROB. 18.

*What is the reason that when we come to rest our selves after much walking, we find our selves more weary a while after?* 64

PROB. 19.

*Why is it good not to let a wicked man, that hath power to do what miſchief he pleaſe, perceive that we are jealous of him?* 66

PROB. 20.

*Whence comes it that Beaſts do know naturally how to ſwim, and that Man hath need to learn?* 74

PROB. 21.

*What is the reaſon that the fruits that grow at the tops of the boughs, are the beſt?* 79

PROB. 22.

*Why do good men think they ought to ſpeak in proper terms of other Paſſions and Vices, but not of things that*

*that regard Wantonneſs and Corporal love?* 81

PROB. 23.

*Whence comes it that they ſay whatſoever cures us and is good for us, diſlikes us, and that on the contrary, we love that which hurts us?* 90

PROB. 24.

*What is the reaſon that children in winter, though their face and hands ſeem to ſhew that they are more afflicted with cold then men grown, yet are not eaſily perſwaded to warm themſelves?* 95

PROB. 25.

*Whence comes it that when we are in affliction we are better diverted by the repreſentation of ſome Tragick Hiſtory, or by the recital of ſome great misfortune, then by more mer-*

*ry shews or facetious tales.* 97

PROB. 26.

*Why do some noises make a man sleep?* 100

PROB. 27.

*What is the reason we aggravate our miseries, and love to perswade others that we are very unfortunate?* 105

PROB. 28.

*Why do many men laugh to see another man fall?* 113

PROB. 29.

*What is the reason that they which embrace civil and worldly affairs with too violent an ardor, are subject to lose all sense of Religion and the knowledge of a Deitie?* 115

PROB.

PROB. 30.

*What is the reason that the lowest Spirits are commonly most perswaded of the truth of their opinions?* 120

PROB. 31.

*Whence is it that in the greatest subjects of affliction, we do many times take up more readily a constant resolution, then in others that are much lighter?* 122

PROB. 32.

*Wherefore are old men great talkers?* 123

PROB. 33.

*Whence comes it that in all kind of things those that do but meanly in them, are most commonly more severe and rigid Judges of others, then those that excell therein, and hold the first rank?* 127

PROB. 34.

*Whence comes it that it is ſo eaſie to blame and finde fault, that the leaſt able do it beſt, and that it is much more hard to commend?* 132

PROB. 35.

*What is the reaſon that when the Winter hath been very cold, they commonly ſay, the Summer that follows will be very hot?* 136

PROB. 36.

*What is the reaſon that Fear makes one's hair ſtand on end?* 138

PROB. 37.

*Whence comes it that many being in a Frenzy have ſpoken Latin, or Greek, without having ever learned either of theſe Languages?* 141

PROB.

PROB. 38.

*What is the reason that a too earnest entreaty makes us unwilling, instead of inciting us, to grant that which is desired of us.* 146

PROB. 39.

*What are the causes of the marvellous things which we observe in the Silk-worm?* 151

PROB. 40.

*Why are good men oftentimes subject to a light promptitude of Choler?* 161

PROB. 41.

*Whence comes it that they say, the love of Grandfathers to their Grand-children is greater then that of their Fathers?* 165

PROB.

PROB. 42.

*Why is it that a rare and eminent vertue which ſhines in a Prince, raiſes greater motions of love in the lower ſort of people then in other men?* 168

PROB. 43.

*What is the reaſon that Shame makes a redneſs ariſe in the face?* 177

PROB. 44.

*What is the reaſon that when we bluſh, it appears eſpecially in the forehead?* 185

PROB. 45.

*What is the reaſon that Praiſes make a man bluſh?* 187

PROB. 46.

*What is the reaſon a man laughs more at*

*at a pleaſant jeſt, or a merry tale, when he himſelf that tells it doth not laugh?* 190

PROB. 47.

*Why do we laugh in ſeeing a thing very ill-favoured, ſince that which delights the mind, one would think, ought to have in it ſome perfection?* 193

PROB. 48.

*What is the reaſon that Man being inclined to flatter himſelf, doth nevertheleſs aggravate his own imperfection above the truth; as for example, in ſaying there is nothing but folly, and injuſtice, and ingratitude in the world?* 198

PROB. 49.

*What is the reaſon that according to the common ſaying of the Poets and of Ariſtotle himſelf in the ſecond book*

*book of his Politicks, Valiant and courragious persons are most subject to love?* 208

PROB. 50.

*Whence comes that aversion to marriage of persons too near?* 212

PROB. 51.

*Whence proceed the excessive Heats of the moneth of* August, *and the other effects which are attributed to the Dog-star?* 221

The End.

## Prob. I.

*What's the reason that the addreſs and ſubtilty of wit, which appears in the execution of an evil action, makes us think it ſometimes more ugly, and ſometimes leſs?*

THis Queſtion having two parts, doth not the reaſon of the firſt conſiſt in this, that he which is ingenious and imployes his wit to do ill, ſeems to be more ungratefull towards God, in abuſing the gifts which he hath received of him? Or elſe is it, that he which

hath cunningly carried on a very malitious action, ſeems not to have been touched with any remorſe of conſcience that troubled his judgement, for which reaſon he is accounted more wicked and more unnatural? Or elſe, is it that an evil action full of wit and addreſs, cannot have been committed by a ſudden and pardonable motion; and that this addreſs which appears in it, ſhews that a man hath digeſted it at his leaſure, that he had a long time had it in his mind, and that he executed it with a full and conſtant will? Or elſe, is it becauſe he that ſins ſo craftily, ſeems to have been very violently deſirous to ſin, ſince it is certain that a violent deſire whets the wit, and renders it fruitful in inventions? Or elſe, is it becauſe the more ingenious a treaſon is, the more cloſe and ſecret alſo it is; ſo that there is requiſite the more impudence and diſſimulation to execute it? Or laſtly, is it becauſe the rendring

deceitful

deceitful by a very refined treaſon, the common aſſurances which we take of things, is an undermining the foundations of publick repoſe, and after a particular manner, the ſhaking of nature, which hath not given us any better means to guide our ſelves in civil ſociety, and an inſtructing of knaves new wayes to hurt honeſt men, ſo that this is a being doubly guilty; as a thief is doubly guilty, if not content to ſteal the fruits of a garden, he enters into it by ſome place formerly inacceſſible, and makes a new way for thoſe that ſhall have a mind to imitate him? But if this be ſo, whence comes it then, that at other times the ingenuity that ſhines in the execution of an ill action, makes us blame it leſs ſharply, and ſweetens the hatred it ought to beget in us? Is it in this caſe not ſo odious, becauſe the luſtre of wit may in ſome ſort repair the defect of it? Or elſe, becauſe when experience teacheth

us, that the *beauty* of the mind, and a *black* malice ſeldome lodge together, and do not willingly aſſociate; we do then frame ſome excuſeable motives to an evil action, when we ſee ſome gentleneſs ſhine in it, and conceive that he that did it, was forced to it, either out of *Gallantry*, or by the ſtrength of ſome ſudden *Paſſion*, rather than out of an extream *Malice* and *ill-nature*?

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## Prob. 2.

*Whence comes the cuſtome of making fire-works, and ſhooting off guns, either when a peace is made, or after a victory, or at the entrance of Princes into ſome City, or upon other the like occaſions?*

First, as to publick rejoycings; Is it becauſe joy which is a violent dilatation of our ſpirits, cannot be better expreſſed then by ſhews which

which consist only in violent dilatations of powder by fire? Or else, if there be no likelyhood that men did so nicely regard such a relation, and that mans imagination out of a secret impulse, took up a thing that resembles the motion of joy to express it by? Is it rather because *Light*, which all these Artificial fires redouble, is naturally the Emblem of *Joy*, and does naturally delight the imagination more than any thing? And therefore we call *sadness* a *dark* cloudy humor, and when we speak of it, we say that it overspreads the mind as 'twere with a *cloud*. Or else, is it not because we finding that our *own* voice is too weak to represent our joy, and that it is wholly unequal to the greatness of our contentment, we borrow the mouth of Cannons, and the noyses of powder to express it, and to carry the news of it speedily on every side, and make it as it were even mount up to heaven? It is manifest that *Joy* of all

the Paſſions is that which deſires moſt to be known and publiſhed, and a joyfull man is equally raviſhed that his friends and enemies know that he is ſo. Or elſe, as it is a pleaſure to ſee the picture of ſome great Dragon, which had frighted us, after that we have no more cauſe to fear it; is it not alſo delightful for the ſame reaſon to ſee the vain images of troubles, violences, and paſſed wars in the fires of joy after that a peace is begun? Or elſe may we take it thus, that as it is a ſign a man hath faſt bound a ſavage beaſt, when he can play with it without harm, and without dread, and make a paſs-time of its rage and fury; ſo it is a ſign that one hath faſt chained up that cruel monſter, War, when one can freely ſport with the moſt terrible inſtruments of its fury, when one can make them vomit up, whatever they have moſt hurtful and affrighting, without any mans receiving either fear or hurt thereby; and that one

makes

makes them ſerve for a divertiſement to Women and Children? Or elſe is not this *ſecondary* and innocent uſe which we make of them as it were a teſtimony that we aboliſh the *firſt*; and therefore alſo when we would ſpeak of a profound peace, we uſe to ſay that all the inſtruments of War ſhall become inſtruments of Husbandry, or ſhall be employed to other uſes?

Now ſeeing that fireworks and the reports of the Canon are uſed to repreſent a publick joy, is it not for the ſame reaſon that they are uſed at the entrance of Princes into ſome City, as it were to teſtifie to them that their arrival is eſteemed a publick happineſs? Or elſe was it not firſt inſtituted on this manner, out of an extream *flattery*, as if they meant to ſay, that they judged the ſoul of the Prince that is thus received, ſo *Martial*, that they thought they could not better pleaſe him, than by ſhows that repreſent *War*?

If any one, notwithstanding all this, shall wonder, that to *receive* a Prince, we do to him in like manner as we would do if we desired to *drive* him *away*, and that we express our *kindness* by the most proper marks of *hatred* and *hostility*: is it not on the contrary, partly for that the imagination of men is carried to it, because naturally a violent *love* borrows the characters of *hate*? Therefore we see that beasts when they make much of their little ones, they strike them little blows, and toss them up gently into the air; and that mothers caressing their children with all tenderness, give them little *pats* and call them *rogues*: and that the best friends delight to quarrel with one another seemingly and in jest: and we might questionless prove the same by *wanton love*, chose we not rather to pass by this proof, then to write any thing that should defile this paper. And if yet you demand of me, why a violent *love* borrows

borrows the characters of *hatred*; Is it not out of a too great desire of flying the appearances of flattery, and false amity, that it runs into this contrary extream, which is more irrational; as if flying from an enemy, a man should cast himself down a precipice? Or rather that in this there is nothing done otherwise than ought to be, but that extream *love* hath some characters like to the violence of *hatred*, because generally all extreams resemble one another?

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PROB. 3.

*Whence is it that the Choler of him that hath no cause to be afraid of us, and hath our necks under his feet, is sometimes sooner appeased by bravado's, and boldness, than by humility and entreaties?*

IS it not for the reason that *Montagne* gives of it; namely that

generous persons suffer themselves rather to be overcome by the generosity and greatness of the courage of him whom fortune hath laid low, than at his cryes and groans, because they are more ready to reverence the image of vertue, then simply to be bent by compassion, which many times may be unreasonable? Or else, is it from some other causes, as for instance this, that it is a thing that astonishes and surprizes him who can do what he please with us, to see that instead of submitting to him, we brave him, and that every astonishment is as it were an arrest and surprizal of the spirit, which consequently interrupts the motion of Choler, and gives the soul that is surprized with it, time to be better advised? To this might be added, perhaps, that in Choler the soul many times moves not, but by the violence of the first swing that is given it; and that in this case if one can stop it, it is infallibly extinct; as

one

one deads the motion of a body which is moved only by the violence of an impression it receives, if one stop it but one sole moment. Or else, is it because the bravado's and boldness of those whom an extream misfortune hath cast down, doth not shew so much *Constancy* and *Resolution*, although at the first sight it seems to do so; as on the quite contrary *Despair*, because he that *hopes* nothing, doth likewise *fear* nothing; so that instead of raising *Choler* it excites *Pitty*? Or else may we venture to say, that naturally every thing is extinguished by the same causes which made it live, when they are too abundant; and that as *Love* is extinguished by too free and too wanton caresses, and *Fire* by too great an abundance of wood cast on it, it may fall out some times after the very same manner, that the extremity and utmost excess of injuries *appeases* Choler instead of *provoking* it? Or else, is it not because the reproaches,

proaches, and bravado's of those that see themselves to be in our power, are a testimony of their *freenes's*, and that we believe they have no worse thoughts than those that they dare thus express with so much liberty, whereas, if they beg of us with submission and humility, we suspect them of *hypocrisie*, and fear least this dissimulation covers some black revenge, and an implacable and furious hatred against us? Or else, is it that for a man to humble himself before us, is to furnish us with a subject of only *Vulgar* clemency, which as it is less fair, so it doth with less violence attract us; and that, on the contrary, to brave us, after having offended us, is to furnish us with matter for an *heroick* clemency, which is more beauteous in its self, and followed with more of glory? Or lastly, is it that he which doth freely reproach us, and boldly declares our injustice, cutting our soul to the very quick by this violence

lence of his discourse, doth awaken it, makes it come to its self, forces it to be attentive to the reasons he alledges, and makes it comprehend them better, after which, though its interest oblige it to a greater revenge then before, it cannot still continue its rage, because, as *Aristotle* saith very well, *a man is never angry injustly*, that is to say, against that which he doth very clearly know to be reasonable?

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## Prob. 4.

*Whence comes it that Tears are a comfort to sadness, and how are they formed?*

Is it not that Tears do not properly unload the *heart*, as it is commonly said, but the *brain*, which being more dry after it is delivered of those humidities, serves the soul better, and is the cause that he which

is

is afflicted having his reaſon more clear and ſtrong, ſees better the juſt grounds he hath to comfort himſelf? Certainly it is probable enough that the *brain* becomes more free, and the ſpirit more *ſerene* after this *ſtorme* of *tears*, as we ſee the *air* is never more ſerene than after *rain*; and the example of children teaches us that the moiſtneſs of the brain accompanies the weakneſs of reaſon. Or is it moreover that by weeping we diſcharge part of the pituitous humour, or of the melancholy humour, both which caſt the ſpirits into penſiveneſs, and a dull heavineſs or ſtupidity? Truely this ſecond reaſon ſeems not to be void of likelyhood no more than the firſt. But (will ſome one ſay) whence proceed Tears, and what is their fountain? Certainly it is no eaſie queſtion to anſwer; and perhaps, to reſolve it exactly, would require a longer ſearch then can be allowed a Problem. But yet methinks one might venture

venture to say according to the appearances we see, that our inward parts compressing themselves in sadness, as it is the property of compression, there issues from them some moisture by this compression, as from a spunge squeezed: Or else that the brain continuing cold in sadness by reason of the spirits flying to the heart, it yeilds through its coldness some thin substance which becoming heavy, seeks its way out; Or else, as sadness generally weakens whatever is in us, that retentive faculty of him that is sad, is not strong enough to keep back, as it did before, those humidities, which we call Tears, but suffers them to run out when it relaxeth its self.

PROB.

## Prob. 5.

*What is the reaſon there are Tears of joy?*

IS it that a too violent *good* wounds us many times as well as too ſtrong a *light*? Or elſe that every change of condition in which one hath long continued, how happy and advantageous ſoever it be, hath alwayes ſomething of incommodious in it? Or elſe, that there is ſome bitterneſs, and as it were an infuſion of wormwood in the greateſt part of the ſweets of this life? Or elſe, is there not ſome natural reaſon in it? and may we not ſay that *joy* exceſſively dilating our inward parts, doth by this means drive out ſome humidity; becauſe that which is dilated cannot contain it ſelf in the ſame bounds where it was before? Or elſe, is it not that in an affliction,

affliction, we are hindred from weeping, out of a fear for the future, which makes us imploy all our thoughts in consideration of means that may deliver us from that which we fear; so that after we are become more happy, we do yet many times nevertheless cry, to satisfie that desire which we had to do so? Or else, is it not credible, that we never understood our misery better, then when being delivered from it, we can compare the image of it, which is still very fresh in our memory, with a quite contrary condition: so that it is not to be wondred at, if many times this comparison which discovers to us the greatness of it, makes us weep even in the midst of our joy, through a kind of pitty we have of our selves? Or else shall I take it thus, that in the sudden motions of a great joy, the dilatation of the spirits of the heart is so great, that it is weakned thereby, and that our soul

ſoul finding its own weakneſs, by this means is apt to be wounded by every reflexion that hath never ſo little of trouble in it? Or laſtly, do not theſe tears of joy proceed from hence, that learning all on a ſudden, that we are delivered from ſome great evil, under which we have lain a long time, the news cannot preſently gain an entire belief in us: and that as a body that is frozen, doth not loſe its coldneſs at that very inſtant it is brought to the fire; by the ſame reaſon our ſoul cannot loſe that impreſſion of its paſſed ſadneſs, at the very ſame inſtant that the good it was deprived of becomes preſent to it? See then the cauſes which it ſeems may be given of that marvellous ſtate of man, wherein he weeps although he have a ſerene ſpirit, by an accident which we ſee ſometimes happen in the air when it *rains* and *ſhines* both at once. There are are alſo Tears which abundant *laughter* brings into

into our eyes; but they are not of the same *Species* with those I spake of but now; and I conceive, they proceed only from that great and violent agitation which laughter causes within us; for there is no passion which shakes a man all over with greater violence; and it may very well be, that a motion so violent forces out of the eyes some humidity; as we see that the violent agitation of a vessel wherein there is some liquor, makes some drops of it sparkle out; and as the wind that shakes the trees after a rain, makes those drops which lay there, fall to the ground.

PROB.

## Prob. 6.

*Whence comes it that many very wicked men, are oftentimes the beſt friends?*

IT is found by experience, that very bad men are often moſt zealous friends to them that they bear an affection to, nay ſometimes more then the beſt of men. To enquire then the cauſes of this effect, is it not that there is a kind of amity which is not begotten by *reaſon*, but by a means more low, namely long *acquaintance* and *familiarity*: ſo that ſouls of the loweſt rank and that have the leaſt of reaſon, are not incapable of it: but on the contrary are in ſome ſort more capable than others, becauſe not governing themſelves by judgement, they do only follow the impreſſions of other things; amongſt which, that which

*length*

*length of time* and *uſe* makes, is none of the leaſt? Or elſe, is it not becauſe good men are friends only *ad aras*, that is, as far as will ſtand with Religion, and wicked men beyond? So that if they muſt only proſtitute their conſciences to their friends, and tread underfoot all things ſacred, and deſpoile themſelves of the faireſt ornaments the ſoul can be adorned with, they do it very willingly. Or elſe, is it not that as *dogs* are faithful to us, and ſuccour us againſt thoſe that ſet upon us, partly indeed out of *love*, but partly alſo becauſe it is their *diſpoſition* to be eaſily provoked: ſo wicked men help us with great ardour againſt our enemies, and combat them with great animoſity, not only for the affection they bear us, but partly alſo, for that by reaſon of their *natural curſtneſs* and *venome*, of which they are full, they are more apt to be inflamed with a violent choler? Or elſe, is it becauſe it is very natural for us to

love

love with violence something without us; wicked men that love neither *God*, nor *Justice*, nor *common goodness*, are constrained by the force of nature to love infinitely some particular persons? Or else, is it that cultivating only that part of their duty which consists only in *friendship*, and keeping that only as a remainder of the beauty of the soul, which hinders them from altogether resembling savage beasts, they have the more love for that, as a mother hath the more love for her son, if he be her only one? Or lastly, is it not that the nature of things is such, that generally in every extream there is some light mixture of the contrary extream: For instance, we see by experience that in cold Countries there are sometimes in summer more violent heats then those of the hot Countries; and on the contrary, the subtilty of the air of the hot Countries is the reason that sometimes the cold there is more penetrating

trating than that of the cold Countries. The *Germans* that pass for the least subtle people of *Europe*, have more of subtilty than any of the rest in all sort of *mechanick inventions*. The most ingenious people are commonly the most awkward and unapt in some slight things. *Melancholy* persons are subject to more violent joyes, then those that are *sanguine*; *covetous* people, according to the vulger opinion, are sometimes carried out to a greater excess of prodigality then *prodigals*. Men extraordinary valiant do often tremble more then others at the sight of a great danger. *Women*, whose visage is more properly then that of men *the seat of Beauty*, are also more susceptible then men of an extream and horrid *uglineſs*. Lastly, to return to the mixture of goodness and wickedness, one of the cruellest Emperours of *Rome* could not, as the Historian saith, be present at the

the acting of a *Tragedy*, but those faigned miseries which he there heard, raised a compassion in him which made him weep. We read as much of another Tyrant of *Greece* of the same nature; and when a man is arrived at the highest degree of wickedness, the last crime he commits, is to be his own murderer, and voluntarily to throw himself into everlasting pains, by the violence of the remorse of his conscience. In which there seems to be a certain air and shaddow of magnanimity and heroick goodness.

PROB.

PROB. 7.

*What is the reaſon that the Wind which comes in at a window or a little hole, is more dangerous than that which we feel abroad in the open field?*

UPon this Problem ſome may poſſibly think, that as the *water* meeting with a very narrow channel, becomes more rapid; ſo the *wind* that comes in at a door, or a window, or a ſmall chink, for the ſame reaſon redoubles its violence: Which is very true, but nothing to the purpoſe, for the clearing the difficulty of this Queſtion: becauſe it is certain that a very little wind gliding in at a cranny, is more apt to hurt one, then another wind much more violent, when one is in the open field. This cauſe then being thus rejected, is it not rather becauſe

the wind which we suffer in the open field doth presently close the pores through its coldness, and so arms us against it self: whereas the wind that comes into the house by some little hole, finds us hot all the time, and consequently doth, as long as it continues blowing, find our flesh soft, and easily penetrable. Or else, is it because the wind that cools only one part of us, such as that is which comes in at a little crack, makes the spirits, to which this coldness is an enemy, fly to the other parts, which is hurtful to this? Or else, in plain terms, as the welfare of a Commonwealth consists in a certain proportion of the *Citizens* one to another; so the good state of the *body* is a certain equal temper of all the *parts*: so that when any thing breaks this equality and harmony, and cools one part, while the rest continue warm, this is in it self a malady, and it were better they had been all equally cooled? Or else, is it because the

wind

wind that one ſuffers in the open field, is a very *wide*, and as it were *broad* motion of the air, which arriving at us, muſt needs break it ſelf againſt our body, as it were a *wave*, and paſs on each ſide without penetrating it: Whereas the wind of a little hole, being *ſharp*, doth the better *penetrate* our pores, and doth us the more miſchief: as we ſee that an *arrow* which does not hurt us if it be caſt at us *broadwiſe*, wounds and pierces us if it hits us with the *point*? Or laſtly, doth not that which *Plutarch* ſaies, contribute to the ſame effect, *viz.* that the wind of a little hole, hurts us the more, becauſe we take no heed of it, and that ſo we ſuffer it a great while before we put our ſelves in a condition to avoid it?

## Prob. 8.

*What is the reaſon that Evil is more active than Good?*

IT is a very ſtrange thing, and yet very true, that *Evil* is more active than *Good*. *Grief*, which is an evil, is more active than *pleaſure*, and ſurmounts it ſo much in violence, that although a man be at the ſame time tickled with all the pleaſures that can flatter the ſenſes, a ſmall *Grief* will be able to ſpoil all his happineſs. As Grief is ſtronger than Pleaſure; ſo Fear, which is a production of Evil, is a paſſion much more violent than *Hope*, which is a production of Good. *Bad examples* have more force to debaſe our minds, then *good* have to raiſe them up. *Poyſons* are ſtronger than *Remedies*; and whereas there is not any remedy that can cure us of our maladies,

ladies, unleſs it be applyed to us, there are poyſons ſo violent that they kill us with the very ſmell of them, if they do but come nigh our noſtrils. Things that are the ſweeteſt to the taſte, as *Honey* and *Sugar*, are not yet ſo ſweet, as *Wormwood* is bitter: and if you mingle an equal quantity of them together, the reſult will be bitter and not ſweet, the ill ſavour prevailing over the good. Laſtly, to omit nothing upon this ſubject, and to run through all kind of things by which this truth may be cleared, although amongſt colours *White* be naturally more excellent than *Black*, as more approaching to the nature of Light: So it is, as Painters have obſerved, that it is the moſt feeble of all; and that, if one mixeth it in an equal quantity with *black*, it is alwayes vanquiſht. But what then is the cauſe of a thing that ſeems ſo contrary to reaſon? I anſwer, that there can be no other given of it, but this, that Good

here *below*, is not in its fountain, and that we ſee only ſome weak raies and ſmall ſparks of it; for if it were at *home* in its fountain, it would infallibly conquer Evil, and would be too ſtrong for it, ſince that *Activity* being a *Good*, it is impoſſible but that it ſhould be a property and dependance of *Good* rather then of *Evil*. But as of two Kings, he that is the ſtrongeſt may be vanquiſhed by the other, in a place where he hath not the body of his forces, and his greateſt power: So it may very well be that *Good* may be more active than *Ill*, and yet that it may be vanquiſht by it in *this* world where we are, and, as I may ſo ſay, in this *lower region* of things, where it is not in its fountain, and in its greateſt glory, and from hence may be drawn a very ſtrong conſideration to demonſtrate *the exiſtence of God*, as I could ſhew more at large, and more clearly, if it were here my deſign.

PROB.

## Prob. 9.

*What is the reason that Water-drinkers are greater lovers of fruit then others?*

Is it not because *water* hath a certain faint quality that offends the stomach, and the juice of fruit corrects that quality, and is to them as a kind of *wine* which they are not averse from? Or else, doth not the same reason that makes them love water, make them also love fruit, to wit, because they love all things that are moist and cooling, and that fruit as well as water is in the number of things that are most so? Or else, is it not because they which drink water only, do with more difficulty digest, and for this reason they love things that are easily digested, such as are most fruits, and prefer them before viands that give more pain to

the natural heat? And if any demand, Whence it is that they ſay alſo, that on the contrary thoſe which are great lovers of wine, do not care at all for fruit: Is it not the contrary to thoſe reaſons I now mentioned? Or elſe, do they not hate fruit, becauſe by their moiſture, they dull and deaden the palate, and ſo render it leſs ſenſible of the pleaſure to which they are ſo much addicted? Or doth not the ſame reaſon for which they love ſalt and drying meats, make them alſo hate thoſe that quench the thirſt, amongſt which it ſeems fruit holds the firſt rank?

PROB.

PROB. 10.

*What is the reason there is no such enmity as that which succeeds amity?*

IS it not because our mind doth ardently affect all *new* things, and loves *change*; and that when we come to hate him, whom we have a long time loved, it is a very great *novelty* and an extream *change*, which consequently hath some particular allurement to attract our minds and engage it more violently in its design? Or else, do not great friendships leave behind them great enmities, because they could not have been destroyed but by great quarrels, and great subjects of hatred and discontent? Or else, is it because as a *stranger*, whom we do not know, cannot be either hated or loved: by the same reason, he that is

very well *known*, may be hated more, and loved more than another; and that there are none so well known to us, as those whom a long friendship hath made us familiarly acquainted with. And indeed as the great knowledge we have of them makes us more lively imagine the motions of hatred they bear us, the *words* they will say, the *thoughts* they will have, and their very *gestures* in their anger, it is credible that this serves to inflame our wrath. Or else perhaps we may say that those, that are great lovers of one another, do only *seem* so hate more then other men; and perhaps they seem so, because that some relicks of friendship, which they cannot chase out of their mind, rendring the injuries which they mutually do one another, more grievous, makes them complain thereof with words fuller of passion, and talk of it unceſſantly. Indeed it is questionless much more grievous to be wronged by him that one loves, then

by

by him that one hates; because this kind of wrong raises as it were a *Civil war* in our passions, exciting one part of our heart against the other, and hinders us not only from *obtaining* what we desire, but also from *desiring* it compleatly and without repugnance of a piece of our selves; and *Lovers* may be good testimonies of this truth; for it is certain, as there are many waters that do not offend the *sound* parts of our bodies, but yet when they touch a *sore* place, cause there incredible pain: So this sweet wounding of their heart, makes them most sensible of injuries, which, without that, would not vex, nor move them at all. Or, lastly, those that loved very dearly, do combate one another with the cruellest acts of enmity, to learn, as I may so say, to hate one another, and to confirm themselves in that bitterness and violence, into which they are faln, because they find, that all sorts of habits are

fortified

fortified by exercise, and by the acts which they produce.

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PROB. II.

*Why hath extream affliction no tears?*

DOth it not proceed from hence, for that the soul in an extream affliction, hath no *livly* apprehensions, such as those must be that raise tears, but falls into a kind of *stupidity* and *insensibleness*? Or is it not because when we are extreamly afflicted, Nature, which finds that the greatness of our Affliction would make us shed too many tears, and that so great an evacuation might excessively weaken, instead of comforting us, keeps them back altogether, and resists the motion of our disordered minds, which, were it not for that, would abuse this soveraign remedy, and employ it to our own ruine? Or else, may we not upon

upon this subject say, that he that is mightily afflicted, cannot weep as he would do, because generally every excessive passion hinders it self from arriving at its end, and becomes an obstacle to its self; and that for this reason those that are oppressed with too much *Fear*, desiring to flie, find that it hath nailed their feet to the ground; and that their hand shakes that are too much in *Choler*, and that they cannot express but by inconsequent and disjoynted words, the greatness of their passion, no more then those whom a too great *Love* possesses, or those who are in a too great excess of *Joy*? Certainly it seems that this is not void of likelihood. And if it be asked, Why every excessive passion fails of arriving at its end? it may be answered, that this happens to it, because it is a malady of the soul, and a defect; and that the qualities proper to a malady are, impotence, weakness and ill success. Or else, every in-

inordinate passion is an obstacle to its self, and is impotent, because it desires things *vast* and *infinite*, and beyond all *possibility*, which hinders our soul from executing those that are *real* and *possible*. For we see evidently, that he which is moved with a very great *Choler*, cannot express, at least in common and ordinary words, his resentment, and the indignity which raised it, because he seeks the most strong, and desires to use a more eager expression then the language of man is capable of. It is plain also, that *Lovers* do many times *back* and *hammer* instead of *speaking*, for the same reason, namely because they would invent terms that should be as it were all *flame*, and have more *force* and *energie* then they can have; and that a like desire is the cause also why *Joy*, which is so *talkative*, becomes *mute* in being increased too much, or brings forth only sighs and inarticulate and confused sounds. And as for excessive

*Fear*,

*Fear*, though this be a passion to which one cannot so easily apply this reason; yet one may say possibly, that he which is too lively possest by the image of a terrible and present danger, hinders himself, that in this perturbation and trouble wherein he is, he desires not simply to run, but to use some means more prompt and efficacious then natural and ordinary ones by which a man runs away; and that his imagination thus overslipping whatsoever is real and possible, as that of others which we spake of but now, does not, by reason hereof, put in practice those faculties that move the parts of his body; for it is evident that it is the operation of the *Fancy* that must put in practice those faculties. But however it be, it is very likely that *Anger*, *Joy*, and *Love*, fail of expressing themselves well, for this reason; and if it be so, we may with likelihood say, that even so he which is very much afflicted, cannot weep,

because

becauſe that his ſoul diſdaining the common characters of ſadneſs, ſearches in that ardour wherein it is, ſo great ones that they are impoſſible. Or elſe, we may ſay that it doth not ſearch for ſuch, but as that antient Painter, that choſe rather to cover with a veil the face of *Agamemnon*, then venture to repreſent his grief: it alſo chuſeth rather to refrain tears, and words, and not to paint forth the greatneſs of its affliction, then to be forced to paint it by the ſame things which the ſmalleſt of afflictions make uſe of. If any one be not ſatisfied with all theſe reaſons, it may yet poſſibly be added, that, as we ſaid before, a moderate compreſſing of the inward parts, may ſqueeze forth the humidity of tears; and a too violent compreſſion of the ſame parts may, on the contrary, keep them in, by cloſing up the paſſages by which they uſe to come to the eyes.

PROB.

## Prob. 12.

*What is the reaſon ſome things are gotten beſt by neglecting them?*

WE ſaid in the fore-going *Problem*, that a Paſſion being wrought to a very high pitch, is an obſtacle to its ſelf, and hinders us from arriving at what we aim at. Now we will endeavour to give a reaſon of a difficulty like to that, but yet greater, *viz.* Why there are many things which are beſt acquired by neglecting them, and looking another way. Thus for example, the Philoſophers have obſerved to us, that *Glory* is of ſuch a nature, that the beſt means to get it, is to run away from it, and not to deſire it, and that ſhe favours thoſe moſt, that do leaſt regard her. *Pleaſure*, if we conſider it well, is like to it in this: for the ſoul being ſoftened through the

becauſe that his ſoul diſdaining the common characters of ſadneſs, ſearches in that ardour wherein it is, ſo great ones that they are impoſſible. Or elſe, we may ſay that it doth not ſearch for ſuch, but as that antient Painter, that choſe rather to cover with a veil the face of *Agamemnon*, then venture to repreſent his grief: it alſo chuſeth rather to refrain tears, and words, and not to paint forth the greatneſs of its affliction, then to be forced to paint it by the ſame things which the ſmalleſt of afflictions make uſe of. If any one be not ſatisfied with all theſe reaſons, it may yet poſſibly be added, that, as we ſaid before, a moderate compreſſing of the inward parts, may ſqueeze forth the humidity of tears; and a too violent compreſſion of the ſame parts may, on the contrary, keep them in, by cloſing up the paſſages by which they uſe to come to the eyes.

PROB.

## PROB. 12.

*What is the reason some things are gotten best by neglecting them?*

WE said in the fore-going *Problem*, that a Passion being wrought to a very high pitch, is an obstacle to its self, and hinders us from arriving at what we aim at. Now we will endeavour to give a reason of a difficulty like to that, but yet greater, *viz.* Why there are many things which are best acquired by neglecting them, and looking another way. Thus for example, the Philosophers have observed to us, that *Glory* is of such a nature, that the best means to get it, is to run away from it, and not to desire it, and that she favours those most, that do least regard her. *Pleasure*, if we consider it well, is like to it in this: for the soul being softened through the

the love of pleaſure, and reſt, becomes ſo ſenſible of incommodities and griefs, ſo vulnerable by all ſorts of croſſes, and ſo feeble, that the leaſt thing wounds it mortally, and makes it deſpair; and even the ſmalleſt misfortunes become great unto it: On the contrary, the contempt of pleaſure gives it preſently a more ſtrong conſtitution, by which it ſuſtains the ſhock of evils that would diſturb her reſt and her pleaſures, and by taking away her delicacy, makes her not to ſtand in need of *extream* pleaſures to be delighted, but to be ſatisfied if ſhe have *common* ones. In *Eloquence* and *Converſation*, there are alſo many *Graces* which are not gotten if one *affects* to have them, and muſt, as I may ſo ſay, *eſcape* from us without our knowledge, to be *natural and charming*. But I need not enlarge here into any large diſcourſe, to prove this verity by many examples, ſeeing we meet with it at every turn in the things of our

our life, and that even the vulgar confeſs it and alledge it very often, though they are ignorant of the cauſe of it. But it conſiſts in this, that *all thoſe things that are beſt gotten by neglecting them, are vanities*; for our ſoul weakens it ſelf by the deſire of vanities; but on the contrary ſhe fortifies her ſelf, and gets more light and ſolidity, when ſhe with-draws her affection from them, and by theſe new forces, which by this means ſhe acquires, ſhe obtains afterwards not only greater advantages, but alſo even thoſe ſlight ones which ſhe contemned, for theſe ſlight and vain good things are commonly appendixes to ſolid ones, and follow them as images and ſhadows follow bodies.

PROB.

PROB. 13.

*What is the reaſon that thoſe things to which we are accuſtomed, are not prejudicial to our health?*

THere is nothing more common then that ſaying, that things which we are accuſtomed to, are not prejudicial to our health; and there is commonly a reaſon given of it, with which men are ſatisfied, *viz. that Cuſtom is a ſecond Nature.* But certainly I conceive, that he which will a little caſt the eye of his mind upon this anſwer, and conſider it at his leiſure, will ſee it vaniſh. For *Cuſtom* hath indeed ſome power upon our inclinations, and on the things which depend on the *ſoul*: but I do not ſee that it hath the ſame power in natural changes, and things that depend purely of the *body*. To underſtand it clearly, Suppoſe that a man

man ſhould a hundred times hold ſome Combuſtible body very near the fire, you will ſee plainly that it will never accuſtom it ſelf to endure the power of it, without receiving harm; nay, on the contrary, it will conſume by little and little: Even ſo, if moiſture be contrary to the welfare of a body, it is very manifeſt that it will never accuſtom it ſelf ſo well to be moiſtened, but it will ſtill receive dammage from the wet. Since then this anſwer is not ſatisfactory, ſhould we not rather ſay, that there cannot be rendred any univerſal reaſon of it, but that it happens oftentimes for ſeveral particular reaſons, which have nothing of common, that many things ceaſe to hurt after that one hath been accuſtomed to them? As for example, *Cold* doth not hurt him that is uſed to endure it, becauſe it ſhuts up the pores and thickens the skin; and that he that hath a thick skin, and his pores cloſed, muſt needs be more

difficultly

difficultly hurt by external qualities. On the contrary, he that is used to walk bare-headed in the field, receives no hurt from the heat of the Sun, as may be seen in the *Bohemians* children, and in the Peasants of some part of *France*, by reason that this very heat hath sucked by little and little from their brains, all those humidities which might have bred Rheumes or Catarrhs. *Violent labour* also doth not hurt those that are used to it, for that it dryes the Nerves, and the Nerves cannot be dryed, but they are hardened, nor hardened without becoming stronger, and fitter either to bear a great weight, or to thrust a thing with vehemency. Or else, is there in it some grosse mistake? and should we not rather say, that things which we are used to, do not cease to hurt, because they have lost the power to do it, through use: but that when a man hath long used a thing, without falling into any remarkable inconveni-

ence,

ence, it is a ſign it was not contrary to him at the firſt, although it ſeemed to be ſo: and therefore Phyſitians do very wiſely permit him to uſe it for the future. Or elſe (if we muſt however find out ſome reaſon common to all the effects which this Problem comprehends) doth it not conſiſt in this, that as oftentimes *Good* is in the *middle*, and *Evil* in the *extreams*; ſo alſo on the contrary that ſometimes *Evil* is only in the *mean*, and *Good* in the *extreams*, ſo that an hurtful thing having by length of time brought our temper into ſome extream, it may by this means deliver us from the evil which it brought upon us. But that *Evil is ſometimes in the middle, and Good in the extreams*, there are that prove it by ſeveral reaſons: For they ſay that the *higher* and the *lower* regions of the air are more calm then the *middle* region, in which ſtorms and tempeſts are formed; that the extream *force* or extream

difficultly hurt by external qualities. On the contrary, he that is used to walk bare-headed in the field, receives no hurt from the heat of the Sun, as may be seen in the *Bohemians* children, and in the Peasants of some part of *France*, by reason that this very heat hath sucked by little and little from their brains, all those humidities which might have bred Rheumes or Catarrhs. *Violent labour* also doth not hurt those that are used to it, for that it dryes the Nerves, and the Nerves cannot be dryed, but they are hardened, nor hardened without becoming stronger, and fitter either to bear a great weight, or to thrust a thing with vehemency. Or else, is there in it some grosse mistake? and should we not rather say, that things which we are used to, do not cease to hurt, because they have lost the power to do it, through use: but that when a man hath long used a thing, without falling into any remarkable inconveni-

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extream

extream *weakneſs* of the Suns rayes do equally render the air ſerene: but that when they have only a moderate force, they *raiſe* vapours which they cannot *ſcatter*: That man ſhould either not reaſon at all, but follow plain common ſenſe, as the Peaſants do, or elſe reaſon exactly and profoundly, and become truly learned; becauſe reaſoning by halves, and being learned by halves, is the way to embroyl ones ſelf in a thouſand doubts that others know not; that Angels and things inanimate are equally incapable of miſery, but that thoſe natures that are in the middle between theſe two extreams, are only ſubject unto it. Though theſe examples be taken from things far remote from the matter in hand, yet they may bring us to a belief that it is many times after the ſame manner in things which belong to the health of our bodies.

PROB.

PROB. 14.

*Whence comes it, that (as it is the saying of some body) a great service is not so proper to gain our affection, as many petty services done in a continued series and on all occasions?*

IS it not because a *great service* may be received in an *instant*, whereas this train of petty services takes up in the gaining of our heart, a great deal of *time*, which must needs help forward the business mightily with all sorts of causes? Or else is it that when any ones beneficence descends upon us thus by little and little, and as it were *drop by drop*, we do at the several times we receive it, make more several reflections upon the obligation which he layes upon us, so that thus his benefits do *sink* the better to our hearts, like herein

to a *gentle* and *soft rain* falling by little and little, which penetrates better into the earth, whereas great and *violent showers* only sweep it and run away without soaking in? Or else, is it that this continued train of petty devoires and services, each of which apart is not of any consideration, leads us to amity and good liking by so sweet and gentle a force, and brings us on so insensibly, that we perceive it not, and so make no resistance? Or else, as we love more those meats which having delighted the *palate* do not lie heavy upon our *stomacks*; do we not in some sort love more for the same reason the services that do us good, and yet leave no weight of necessary and forced *obligation* upon our *spirits*; as questionless petty services often reiterated do, because that on one side their number supplies their weakness, and makes them countervaile a great benefit all at once; and that on the other side they are of

such a nature, that he which did them cannot handsomely reproach them to us? Whence it comes that the acknowledgement we preserve of them in our minds, seems to us to be the more voluntary. Or else that which we search for, proceeds it not hence, that he which doth us a great good turn, is believed by us to do it out of vanity, to gain the reputation of generousness or bounty, because a great service makes a noise, and is exposed to view; but that we cannot suspect the same of him who is assiduous to render us a thousand petty devoires, which appear not to the eyes of others, and are perceived only by our selves? Or else shall we say, that one may do us a great service in our absence, but that [illegible] train of petty services presupp[illegible] that he that would make himself be beloved, is not absent from him by whom he desires to be beloved: but that on the contrary, he converses ordinarily

with him; and that this familiarity is that which aids him principally to insinuate himself into our heart? Or lastly, doth not this also contribute to it, that when we have received some notable benefit from another, as it is a thing commonly known, it happens many times, that those whose interest it is to make us forget it, have so much artifice to extennate it, to give it ill interpretations, and to take away its lustre and weight, that they seduce us, and extinguish in us the resentment which we should have had of it; whereas when any one hath insinuated himself into our favour, and hath witnessed to us the ardour of his affections in many occurrences, by petty services which have not been observed by others, the resentment which we have thereof is not exposed [illegible] assaults of his enemies, or rivals, and he is so much the more assured, the more it is secret and the cause of it not known?

PROD.

## Prob. 15.

*What is the reason that a great joy makes us facile to pardon injuries?*

IT is certain that a great *joy* disposes us extreamly to clemency, that it *softens* our hearts, and expells that *hardness* and *bitterness* which injuries have caused in them, and makes us easie to pardon them; and as it is a thing certain, and such whereof the enquiry cannot be otherwise than curious, pleasant, and profitable; I conceive I have reason to allow it a place among'st these *Problems*, and endeavour to discover all the causes of it. In the first place then, I believe I shall speak a very great truth, if I say, that our soul being surprized on a sudden by a great happiness, finds it self secretly obliged to some *soveraign* power, and hath secret motions of *gratitude*

towards it; and that finding its ſelf unable to do it any good whereby to teſtifie its thanks, it is ſo much the more conſtrained to do good to his *works*, that is to ſay, that it becomes good, and diſpoſed to do good, even to thoſe that have wronged it. But beſides this reaſon, which without doubt contributes very much to the effect we ſpeak of, I conceive that *Joy* doth beſides of its own nature beautifie the *ſoul*, as well as it beautifies the *countenance*. And indeed, ſeeing that *Joy* is more according to nature than *Sadneſs*, ſeeing it is a *Good*, as Sadneſs is an *Evil*, it muſt needs for this reaſon inſpire alſo into it and waken the paſſions that are more conform to nature, and better than thoſe which are awakened by *Sadneſs*. Now there is nothing more according to nature then *Goodneſs*. If it be objected that *Affliction* corrects us, and makes us better, I anſwer, that it doth not do it out of its own nature, but by accident,

accident, as a medicine cures us by accident, although at other times it be a kind of poyson, and is alwayes in some sort contrary to the temper of our bodies. For if we consider affliction in its self, we shall finde that as it is the property of winter and ill weather to kill flowers and to despoile the trees of the ornament of their foliage, even so it blasts the beauties of the soul, soures and debases it. But above all we shall finde, that in cooling and weakening the courage it greatly impaires that generosity from whence issues the pardon of injuries. Philosophers say that *Light* doth naturally beget *Heat*, although it be not a quality of the same *species* with it, by reason of a certain affinity or correspondence of nature which is between them. I suppose it is for the same reason that *Joy* may beget in the soul goodness and vertuous inclinations, though its self be not a vertuous inclination, since that being a

good paſſion, it muſt have ſome analogy with all the good paſſions, as *ſadneſs* muſt have alſo with all the bad ones. But to come to the conſideration of another cauſe of the ſame effect, it ſeems alſo that as an injury made us not angry, but out of an opinion we had that it had caſt us down, when any great proſperity comes to raiſe us up, it muſt for this reaſon appeaſe and ſweeten the grief which this pretended dejectment hath cauſed in us, ſince that it doth in ſome ſort do us reaſon. Or elſe, perhaps the ſoul, in a great proſperity, looking on the preſent which ſmiles upon it, and offers it nothing but matter of ſatisfaction, and a moſt perfect reſt, doth equally take its eye off, both from what is to come, and what is paſt, and therefore hates to remember paſſed injuries, ſince that it cannot do it without looking off from the preſent which is ſo grateful to it, and interrupting its delicious employment: but that which

which ſtill puts it more ſtrongly upon the ſame reſolution, is, that having all on a ſudden received a great bleſſing, it doth paſſionately deſire to enjoy it fully, and not corrupt the ſweetneſs thereof, and that there is nothing can ſo corrupt its ſweetneſs, as a motion of hatred and revenge. For as the act of *Loving* is in its ſelf naturally ſweet, becauſe it is very much according to nature: ſo the motions of *Hatred* are naturally painful and mingled with grief, becauſe they croſs nature; and becauſe the ſoul doth as I may ſo ſay, wreſt and diſtort its ſelf, in receiving them into it, and doth ill employ its faculties. Now that all motion of revenge and hatred of another is naturally painfull and mixed with grief, is a thing that may eaſily be proved. For, beſides that our own ſenſe makes us acknowledge it to be true, we need only to look upon the viſage of man in choler, to confeſſe that nothing doth more reſemble the

visage of a man that is sad; and there appears something of painful and forced, somewhat like to that one sees in the face of a *Porter* employed with all his strength to lift up a great burthen. It is even so also in all other motions of Hate. For in a word, it is as unimaginable, that a man should machinate any *black* designes, and frame within himself some malicious contrivance, without losing the native *quiet* and *serenity* of his spirit, as that the air should continue serene when it is formed into storms and tempests, and that it should be overspread with dark clouds, before it pours down either hail or thunderbolts upon the earth. And as the spring of a Pistol is not at rest, and as it were in its due place, so long as it is cockt, and ready to give fire and kill; So our soul is without doubt restless, and out of its repose, so long as it continues as it were bent to the execution of some malicious act, and is ready to

do miſchief to another. And if we will deſcend from the conſideration of men to that of beaſts, we ſhall there alſo finde ſome teſtimonies of this truth, ſince that they which when they are alone, ſeem to take pleaſure in, conſidering the beauty of the day, of the meadows, of the rivers and forreſts, and are moſt lightſome and ſportive, are alſo the moſt innocent; and that, on the contrary, all the ſavage and blood-thirſty ones are ſad and melancholy, which may be ſeen both by their countenance, and in that they hate and fly the light. It is wiſdom therefore in us to drive from our mindes all malicious thoughts when we would fully enjoy any great happineſs: Or elſe, the joy which a good fortune cauſes in us, renders us ſweet and eaſie to pardon injuries, becauſe after having gotten *external* goods, we do the more violently deſire thoſe that reſpect the *ſoul*, namely *wiſdom*, and *vertue*, as thoſe only which we want,

want, and which remain to us to desire.

## PROB. 16.

*What is the reason there is so much false news spread abroad, and that many delight to make others believe strange things?*

IS it not because a man thinks he doth not do very ill, nor transgresse much the Law of Liberty, to add to that which he receives from others, some small matter, or to take from it some petty and slight circumstance, which yet changes the whole face of the thing; an absurdity like to that of an ill pay-master, that thought he did not any great hurt, and was no dishonest man, in taking away a small cypher from a paper wherein his debt was contained, and in his defrauding his Creditor of a great sum under pretence that

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he took away and blotted out only a ſmall *cyfer*? Or elſe, do not falſe news ariſe principally from hence, that we wholly give credit to our friends when they tell us ſtrange things; and that, on the contrary, our friends enlarge the wonder to us, becauſe they ſee we are delighted with it, and that they are unwilling to deprive us of it by diſabuſing us, and take from us that delightful error in which we are, no more then they would wake us if they knew we were in a pleaſant dream? Or elſe, is it becauſe many men think they do well to make uſe of a *lye* to uphold the *Truth*? Or elſe, are we not chiefly deceived by falſe relations, becauſe we think it reaſonable to give credit to one that is no bad man, but hath on the contrary much of goodneſſe; whereas we ſhould conſider whether he be not guilty of ſome weakneſſe, becauſe a man lyes through *weakneſs* as well as *malice*? Or laſtly, may we

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not ſay that ill news is ſpread principally for this reaſon, that many pleaſe themſelves in making others believe ſtrange things? the truth is, experience evidently diſcovers this malady with which they are affected; and if it be demanded why they are thus delighted with it, methinks one may ſay, it is either becauſe they would have theſe great and ſtrange things be ſo, and that being unable to give them a *real* exiſtence, they give them at leaſt a *ſhaddow* of it in printing them upon the ſpirits of men: Or that half-believing them, and taking pleaſure to believe them, they labour to confirme themſelves in their opinion, by drawing many others to be of it, and acquiring to it good ſtore of ſuffrages; or that being unable to believe them in any ſort, yet when they ſee that an another believes them, they contemplate the joy which they imprint on his eyes, and on his viſage, and hear the exclamations which admiration

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forces from him, and the gestures it puts him in, and receive hereby some *reflection* of his pleasure; like in this to many sick people, who though they cannot eat themselves, yet delight to see others eat with a good appetite?

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## Prob. 17.

*What is the reason that having been long on horse-back, a man doth better refresh himself by walking a little on foot, than by sitting still?*

Is it not that as a *colour* is more contrary to a *colour* then to a *smell* or a *sound*, by the same reason one *motion* is more contrary to another *motion* then to *rest*, and so easier effaces the impression of it, by that Law which saith that things which are under the same *genus* do more vigorously combate one another? Or else, is it that the body of the horse,

horſe, on which we have been a long time, hath too much preſſed many parts of ours, and by this means ſhut up certain paſſages; and that when we walk, the ſpirits running to theſe parts to move them, do raiſe them up, and by this means open whatſoever was there preſſed, or too much ſtraightned, ſo that they ſoon recover their natural ſituation?

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## Prob. 18.

*What is the reaſon that when we come to reſt our ſelves after much walking we finde our ſelves more weary a while after?*

Is it becauſe the heat which motion drew into our parts rendred them more ſupple, and obedient to the will, in dilitating the nerves; and that after we have reſted a while we have loſt this heat, but we have not loſt our wearineſſe? Or elſe, is

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is becauſe when we walk, our ſweat runs down; but when we come afterwards to reſt, it ſticks upon our skin and benums it, by its humidity, as alſo by its coldneſſe, when the repoſe of the body hath given it means to grow cold? We ſee by experience, that thoſe that come from ſwiming, feel their arms and legs weak, as if they had been beaten, by reaſon of a cold moiſture that reſts upon them. It is obſerved likewiſe, that when after a long motion we come to reſt our ſelves, we ſweat preſently much more; and this is becauſe the motion of the parts of our body doth not then hinder that by which the drops of ſweat do deſcend by their narrow paſſages, the pores. For, as every body knows, two ſeveral motions do very often hinder one the other.

PROB.

PROB. 19.

*Why is it good not to let a wicked man that hath power to do what mischief he please, perceive that we are jealous of him?*

IT is good, first, because he that would do wrong unjustly, hath yet need of a *pretence*, which how vain and frivolous soever it be, may at the least amuse his spirit, and hinder him from considering and clearly discerning the uglinesse and injustice of his action. For, as he that is resolved to be let blood, and hath stretched forth his arm, yet turns his head another way out of a certain horrour which nature hath of every thing that hurts any part of our body: So he that is resolved to do an unjust and wicked action, doth yet turn away his eyes from the injustice which he sees in it, out of a natural

a natural horrour, and endeavours not to ſee it at all, or at leaſt to ſee it leſſe clearly. This is very handſomely repreſented by *Eſope*, in the fable of the *Wolfe* and the *Lamb* that drank at the ſide of the ſame river; for though the Wolfe was reſolved to devour the Lamb, and ſaw that it was beſt for him to do it preſently, for fear leaſt any one ſhould come to her ſuccour, yet he ſtayed a while to reaſon with her, being not able to put himſelf on this action, without ſetting before his eyes ſome *colour* and *ſhew* of juſtice. He begins therefore to complain, that ſhe *troubled* the water; but becauſe ſhe replied that this could not be, becauſe ſhe drank a great way *below* him, which was ſo clear a reaſon that it ſhut out all appearance of the contrary, he could not yet fall to the committing of this evil, but ſeeks another pretence ſomewhat leſſe void of colour, in telling her that ſhe knew well enough, that her

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Father and Mother and all her Anceſtors had been his enemies. Not but that this ſecond reaſon was very extravagant, ſeeing it was the ſole cruelty of the Wolfe, which had bred in the Anceſtors of the Lamb this hatred, which made them only *avoid*, not *wrong* him: but nevertheleſſe this pretence for want of another, ſerved to furniſh him with ſome appearance of Juſtice, without which nature cannot be moved or undertake any thing. According to this then, though a wicked man may be reſolved to do us a miſchief, and hath power to do it, yet he wants a pretence, which he may uſe towards himſelf, and whereby he may (if I may be bold to ſay ſo) finde obedience in his own faculties; We ſhould be therefore ſo far from venturing to furniſh him with one, that we ought carefully to remedy all things from which he may draw one. But we ſhall furniſh him with a pretence and ſhadow of reaſon, if we let him

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ſee that we diſtruſt him, although it be not without juſt occaſion; and this ſhadow of reaſon will ſerve him to conquer that reſiſtance which he findes in his own nature. Secondly, it is good not to give wicked men any teſtimony that we diſtruſt them, becauſe if they believe that we cannot ſo much as imagine they are about to commit a great injuſtice, they will judge us the honeſter, and farther from all treacherous and evil thoughts, and ſo will be more aſhamed to ſin before us, and diſcover to us the baſeneſſe and uglineſſe of their ſouls. Beſides, if a wicked man thinks that we eſteem him an honeſt man, he cannot without regret go about to deſtroy by his actions this belief which is advantageous and glorious to him; and will be ſo much the more loth to do it, as he believes, that it is well eſtabliſhed in our minds, becauſe that

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in doing it, he ſees he wrongs himſelf: but on the contrary, if he thinks we have already an ill opinion of him, he will not have ſo great a deſire to acquire our eſteem, as he would to preſerve himſelf in it, were he poſſeſſed of it; becauſe the deſire of *preſerving* that which a man hath, is more natural then that of *getting*. In the fourth place, if he believe that we are in a profound and entire ignorance of the wrong he intends us, he ſees by the ſame means, that in doing it he will cauſe us more grief, then if we had expected it, and provided our ſelves for it. Now the wickedeſt man hath naturally more of repugnance to bring a great grief upon any one then a little one. Laſtly, beſides all theſe reaſons, there is this ſtill to be conſidered, that if any one thinks that men account him an honeſt man, or that they do not think him very bad,

bad, this serves to perswade him, that what is believed of him, is true, and that indeed he hath not very bad inclinations. Now there is no better, nor handsomer way of reforming by degrees the mind of a wicked man, then to perswade him that he hath some seeds of vertue, and an inclination to worthy things, because that loving himself, and every thing that is in him, he will consequently love vertue, if he believes that it is one of his qualities, and a part of his being; and he will also love vertuous men if he thinks he is like them, as he would love a man that hath nose or eyes like his own. In a word, it is certain that every one acts according to the *Idea* that he hath of himself, and according to that which he believes himself to be: for, those objects which we have most ordinarily before our minds, do by degrees communicate their qualities to our

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souls, and our actions; Now there is no object any man hath more frequently before his mind then himself, so that if he believes himself wicked, the image which he hath of himself must needs exasperate him and make him still worse and worse; On the contrary, if he thinks himself inclined to goodnesse, this belief must needs sweeten him by little and little and inspire into him better inclinations. This is all we have to say upon this *Problem*, which methinks we have by this means sufficiently illustrated: But yet we believe we should by the way add, that the *Rule* which it gives, is not alwayes true, for herein are many *Distinctions* to be used: and especially we must have a care, whether he whose injustice we fear, be a man *intirely* wicked, or whether he have *some* good principles, and be not yet fully resolved to do injustly: For if he be absolutely wicked, we must

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not let him see that we distrust him, for the aforesaid reasons; but if he hath something of generous, and be not wholly confirmed in his evil resolution, it is many times good to let him perceive (but with humility and without bitterness, and rather obliquely then in a direct and open manner) that we see well enough he intends to wrong us, that our unhappiness is manifest unto us, and that we have not any hope. For, besides that this raises more pitty in him, it troubles him to be accounted more unjust then he is, and having something of generous in him, he labours to refute by his actions this ill opinion which we have of him, and desires to shew unto us that we were in an errour when we had such a conceit of him.

## Prob. 20.

*Whence comes it that Beaſts do naturally know how to ſwim, and that Man hath need to learn?*

They anſwer commonly, that Man doth not naturally know how to ſwim, as Beaſts do, becauſe that the firſt time he tryes to do it, he is ſeized with a *Fear* which hinders him from making uſe of his legs and arms freely. But I do not approve this anſwer; for beaſts have at leaſt as much fear as man, the firſt time one caſts them into the water; and I have ſeen ſome of them that would tremble for fear a long time after, and remain aſtoniſht, and for all that ceaſed not to ſwim very well. Beſides, if it were only *Fear* that hindred man from knowing how to ſwim, this would be nothing to them that are ver

very bold, and caſt themſelves without fear into great dangers; and a man in this caſe would know at leaſt how to ſwim in the water of a *Bath*, in the midſt of a company of his *friends*, ſince that then he would have nothing to fear: Or elſe he would know how to ſwim in a very narrow brook, where the bottom may be ſeen all the way, and can leave him no conſiderable fear. Since therefore this anſwer doth not ſuffice, and leaves the difficulty wholly untoucht: I conceive rather, that a man doth not naturally know how to ſwim, becauſe the firſt time he tries, he cannot chooſe but manage his legs and arms by *Reaſon*, and that this hinders him from doing it right, becauſe it is an action that muſt be done by the *imagination* only, after a brutiſh and blind manner. We ſee clearly by experience, that there are many things which we do worſt when we would do them by *Reaſon*. Beſides, I believe it is

naught for a man, the firſt time he tries to ſwim, to be prepoſſeſt with this belief, that he doth not know how to ſwim; whereas beaſts are exempt from all this preoccupation: for, to believe infallibly that one doth not know how to do any thing, is a diſpoſition to do it ill, and to come ſcurvily off. But, beſides theſe two reaſons, in my opinion it is very remarkable, that when beaſts ſwim, they are in their *natural* poſture, becauſe they have not an *erect* ſtature; and do move according as they have an inclination to move naturally, namely, with all their feet at once; and that on the contrary, man lying at his length upon the water to ſwim, is not in the poſture in which he ſhould naturally be, and ſo hath the greater pains to move himſelf in this manner, as even upon the earth it would be painful to him to march upon all four. Or elſe I may ſay upon this ſubject, that the difficulty is not ſo much to know why creatures

tures that are much more *light* than man, are more proper to ſwim; but why he doth not know how to ſwim as well as Oxen, horſes, and ſuch other creatures that are *heavier* than he: To which I anſwer, that it is becauſe Oxen, and Horſes, and ſuch other beaſts, have an inward capacity and cavity of their bodies much greater, which is the cauſe that though their bodies ſink deeper under water by reaſon of their weight, there yet remains part thereof above; and that it happens to them as it doth to veſſels that are high built, to wit, that they continue above the water, whileſt others that are not ſo much laden, but are much leſs, do ſink. Or elſe too, one may rationally ſay, that beaſts do naturally ſwim, becauſe they have for the moſt part a longer neck than man, ſo that although all the reſt of the body be heavy enough to ſink under water, yet in holding up their necks they take their breath at eaſe;

whereas mans body being ready naturally to ſink under water as well as theirs, he hath not a neck long enough, to keep his head notwithſtanding out of the water, and by this means keep himſelf from being choaked. So then *Beaſts* have in this received from nature divers advantages above *Man*, in which ſhe hath not done him any wrong, but on the contrary hath manifeſted the ſame wiſdom which ſhe ſhews in all other things, that ſhe is guided by a moſt admirable and penetrating judgement, which fore-ſees things that depend upon a long train of conſequences. For, this wiſdom foreſaw that *Man* only among all other creatures ſhould know how to make *Boats* and *Bridges*, or to paſs the rivers on *Horſ back*.

## PROB. 21.

*What is the reason that the fruits which grow at the tops of the boughs are the best?*

IS it because that which is most *earthy* and *gross* in the nourishment, cannot reach to the tops of the boughs, so that they receive only that which is more *subtile*, and doth easier find passage through the narrow streights of the wood? Or else, is it because that the tops of the branches are the *newest* and *youngest* parts of the tree, and that for this reason they have the more vertue? Or else, is it for that the fruit which grows at the tops of the boughs, are more exposed to the rayes of the *Sun*, which ripens them better? Or else, because they are more exposed to the beating of the rain, which serves to soften their hardness, and

to make them alſo ſweeter; as we ſee that fruit is ſometimes ſoftned between our hands, and made ſweeter according as we handle it? Or elſe is it, that when there is abundance of nouriſhment in a tree, it paſſeth to the extremities, after it hath provided for the neceſſities of all the other places; but that being arrived at the extremities, and not able to paſs further, it amuſes it ſelf, and ſo feeds thoſe fruits that grow there the better, which conſequently muſt have more of juice and of ſavour. Methinks one may expreſs the courſe of this nouriſhment by the example of a brook, which runs as long as it finds any way, but meeting at laſt ſome obſtacle, which is laid before it, and hinders it from paſſing further, it ſwells and gathers its waters into an heap. Or elſe, laſtly, is it that the nouriſhment, according as it aſcends from the root to the branches, is ſtill more and more concocted by the *Natural heat* of the

the tree; so that for this cause it must needs be that which comes to the ends of the branches, must be most concocted, and most purified?

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PROB. 22.

*Why do good men think they ought to speak in proper terms of other Passions and Vices, but not of things that regard wantonness and corporal Love?*

SOme antient Philosophers discoursing upon the same Question which we have here propounded, have though that this modesty which hinders us from speaking plainly of things that belong to lasciviousness, and the lower and more terrestrial part of Love, was but an abuse and vain ceremonie. Their reasons were, that since we speak in plain terms of all other vices, whereof some are far worse, and that we

dare pronounce the names of *Treason*, *Sacriledge*, *Impiety*, *Assassination*, *Cruelty*, there is no colour of Reason why we should not with the same boldness speak of *vicious Love*, much less that we should not dare to speak of all the effects of *lawful Love*, which hath nothing in it irregular. Whereunto they added, that whatever one might *do* without sin, one might also *speak* without sin. *Montaigne* seems to have been of the same opinion; for in the first Chapter of the third Book of his *Essaies*, he saies, *that the rule which forbids us to express some things in plain terms, is a false rule, and that he scorns to reckon it amongst his true duties.* He saies afterwards, *that it is the* Daughter *indeed of true wisdom, as other things which respect Ceremony, but a* bastard *one; and that he which should undeceive the world of it, would not perhaps do so much mischief, because man acquitting himself of these false offices, thinks himself discharged*

*charged of so much of the obligation which he hath to natural offices.* At last he adds, *that it is only a sparing of Vice, not to dare speak of it, but by a Periphrasis.* For my part, I think that the general opinion of men which is contrary hereto, must needs be better grounded, and that they have reason to look upon it as a piece of brutishness in those that speak plainly of whatsoever belongs to corporeal Love. And I do justly call this opinion *general*, whatever *Montaigne* was pleased to say, since there is no true History found by which it may be proved that there was ever any people wholly void of this modesty; and although there have been some, doubtless it was only a savage people, and scarcely participant of common sense, as certain Nations that have been lately discovered. And a thing doth not cease to be of *common* sense, though it be contradicted out of simplicity by some *particular* people. And though we could

could not tell how to anſwer to the ſubtilties here alledged againſt the general opinion, yet in my judgement it were not wiſdom to diſbelieve it, and follow them. But for all that, I conceive the truth being on our ſide, will furniſh us with arguments to prove, that the objections which are urged againſt it, are weak and ill-grounded. For in the firſt place, *Montaigne* himſelf, in that Chapter where he is ſo much againſt the common opinion in this buſneſs, doth nevertheleſs confeſs, *that there is no action which ought ſo much to humble a man, as this which is here in queſtion; that they are the feet of the Peacock which abate his pride; that our weakneſs and vanity appear there in their beſt apparrel; that when he conſiders the circumſtances of it, he believes that ſaying of the Antients, That man was made by the gods to ſerve them for a May-game; that all other actions admit a wiſe and diſcreet proceeding, except this only; that all*

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*other Passions trouble reason and assail it, but that this doth wholly annihilate it.* I think that in all this he saith nothing but truth, but we may from hence draw arguments against himself; and indeed this truth being supposed, we have ground to say, that then it is impudent and vitious to speak openly of a thing, where the inconstancy of our judgement and the weakness of our nature seems to be at its best, after a particular manner, because it is a sign that he which doth it, doth not much trouble himself with the perfection and dignity of his soul; and that he doth without regret discover the defects and vanities of it. If it be further objected, that yet we speak openly of *Perfidiousness, Sacriledge, Ingratitude and Cruelty*; To this I answer, that good men indeed do openly and without scruple, speak of these things, and that no man is offended at it, because it is presupposed, they are things to which they are not subject.

ject. It is not ſo in the follies and ſordid things which *Love* makes men commit, when for hope of a corporal pleaſure, it makes a man ſubmit himſelf with too much weakneſs to that ſex, which nature hath made inferiour to him: For they are follies to which the beſt have been ſubject; they are weakneſſes from which good men are not totally exempt; and even thoſe which abominate all Cruelties, Treaſons, Theſts and Ingratitudes, and hate them with a perfect hatred, do yet find themſelves weak on this ſide; and that is the reaſon they cannot ſpeak of the more baſe and brutiſh part of this paſſion without bluſhing: and truly they would be impudent, if herein the memory of their infirmity did not produce this effect in them, and if they ſhould ſpeak openly and boldly of their vice, inſtead of avoiding the repreſentation of it to themſelves by formal and direct expreſſions. To confeſs that this is ſo,

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it is to be conſidered, that we ſhould think a rogue impudent and brutiſh without meaſure, if being ſurprized in the fact, and being queſtioned of the manner in which he committed his theft, he ſhould ſpeak of it at large, and with all the circumſtances, without bluſhing and caſting down his eyes for ſhame; and that on the contrary we ſhould think he had ſome remainders of probity left in him, when he dares not ſpeak of it but with difficulty and by halves, making us gueſs his meaning, rather than expreſſing it. Even ſo a man that we know hath committed a notable Treaſon, would be thought very impudent, if he ſhould in company make long diſcourſes of Traytors and Treaſon, and if on the contrary ſuch kind of diſcourſe ſhould not put him into a kind of confuſion. In a word, it becomes him that knows himſelf guilty, to be aſhamed of every thing that repreſents to him his fault. And as for that which

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was ſaid, *that it is only a ſparing the vice of wantonneſs, not to ſpeak as openly of it as of others*, it is as ill-grounded as the reſt. For as for a lye, parricide, murther, impiety, avarice, cowardize and vanity, becauſe they are things which have an uglineſs, which is *eſſential* to them, and therefore inſeparable, it is very true, that the more lively one can deſcribe them, the more hatred and horrour he raiſes of them; nay it may be maintained, that a lively conception of them is enough to make one fly them, without the aſſiſtance of any other diſcourſe; juſt as men run away from blows, or from an houſe on fire, without any need of perſwaſions. But it is quite otherwiſe in Corporal Love; for it hath no *eſſential* deformity, and is bad only by *accident*, namely, for want of neceſſary *circumſtances*; and when it carries us in purſuit of its object with *exceſs*, or by baſe and unworthy *means*. And therefore to moderate

derate it, it is not at all neceſſary to ſet it forth to the life, but on the contrary, by how much the more lively and in proper terms it is deſcribed, ſo much the more doth the imagination of thoſe that hear ſo indiſcreet a leſſon, grow warm with that baſe heat which it is accuſtomed to kindle there. And hence I draw one ſtrong reaſon more, in favour of that truth I maintain. For ſince that to ſpeak in proper terms of this low and ignoble part of Love, is rather helping than weakening it, he that diſcourſes of it in this manner, muſt needs have a deſign to render it more violent, either in himſelf or others; both which are equally beaſtly. Or elſe it muſt needs be, that at the ſame time, he that talks thus, and that he is with his friends, whoſe converſe ought to elevate his ſoul to nobler and more ſpiritual pleaſures, he feels himſelf moved with that laſcivious and terreſtrial ardour; otherwiſe he would never

never love to repreſent to himſelf the effects thereof ſo diſtinctly, becauſe they are of ſuch a nature, that if the imagination be not delighted with them, it is wounded by them, it being not poſſible there ſhould be a *medium* between theſe two extreams.

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## Prob. 23.

*Whence comes it that they ſay, whatſoever cures us, and is good for us, diſlikes us; and that on the contrary, we love that which hurts us?*

IS it that in this they do not ſay true, but that as the Time whileſt we are in ſadneſs ſeems to us longer, for the ſame reaſon the accidents which are offenſive to us, ſeem to us the more frequent? Truly I think that from this Source deſcend many other *Vulgar Errours*; as for example theſe; That a man is hurt ſooner

ſooner in the ſame part where he is already ill: That the wittieſt children do commonly die before they can give their parents that contentment which they hope for from them: That diſaſters follow one another, and ſcarce ever come ſingle: For as we deſire that theſe accidents ſhould never happen, ſo for fear leaſt they happen, we think that they happen alwayes. Or elſe, doth not the errour wherein men are in this buſineſs, proceed from hence, that when we love that which profits us, no man takes any notice of it, becauſe it is a thing conformable to Reaſon and Nature, and upon which our ſpirit ſlides away ſmoothly, as our hand ſlides upon a poliſhed body, where it finds no rub or obſtacle; and that on the contrary, when we love that which hurts us, as it is a thing that aſtoniſhes us, and makes us ſtick ſome time to ſearch the cauſes of it, ſo we ſee it the better, and imprint it the deeper into our memories?

memories? Or elſe happens it not thus, in effect, through the imperfection of finite things, which produces alſo many other effects, that ſeem to be againſt nature? As for example, we ſee that Difficulty *whets* the appetite, whereas it ſhould rather *dull* it; and that Evil is more active then Good, although it ought to be quite contrary, and many other the like things; ſo that this may perſwade us, that it is through this very imperfection that wholſom things offend, and hurtful things delight us? Or elſe, is it becauſe the remedy ought to be contrary to the diſeaſe, and that contraries redouble their force againſt one another by an *Antiperiſtaſis*? Phyſick for this reaſon doth at firſt heighten the diſeaſe, and conſequently alſo the pain. And as Phyſick doth at firſt re-inforce and heighten the diſeaſe, may it not alſo be that hurtful things for the ſame reaſon do delight us more often at the firſt, and encreaſe our vigour,

vigour, and that therefore they pleaſe us? If we ſuppoſe for example, that a man be ſick for want of *heat*, it may be if he uſes *cold* things that are naught for him, they will at the firſt refreſh him and give him ſome ſtrength, by making of his heat increaſe, and redouble it ſelf by an *Antiperiſtaſis*. Or elſe, is not nature at firſt delighted with things that redouble its evil, becauſe that by increaſing it, they may in ſome ſort ſtupifie and dull its ſenſe? And is it not, on the contrary, hurt by thoſe things that cure it? becauſe that in reſtoring it to its ſtrength by little and little, they do as it were awaken it out of that lethargie in which the diſeaſe held it, and ſo make the ſenſe of it the more quick? Or elſe, is it that Nature when ſhe hath need to be cured, is depraved and ill diſpoſed: ſo that it is no wonder if in this condition ſhe be offended with that which is good, and pleaſed with that which is bad for her? Or elſe,

elſe, is it not that as a man cannot take a ſpot out of his *clothes* without making the place a little more threadbare, nor refine *mettals* without diminiſhing them, nor cauſe any great good in a *Common-wealth* without wrong to ſome: ſo alſo we cannot cure our *bodies* of any great infirmity, but we muſt do it ſome dammage; and that as the remedy in curing us, doth us ſome hurt, this is the reaſon why it is irkſom to the ſenſe? If you ask me in particular, What is the reaſon that almoſt all Medicines are bitter, and odious to take? (wherein methinks a great part of the difficulty of this Problem conſiſts) I anſwer, that this happens from its quality, becauſe if the Medicine were not offenſive to the *palate*, neither would it offend the *ſtomach*, ſeeing that it is from one and the ſame quality, that things which have been diſpleaſing to the taſte when they were in the mouth, do excite alſo a ſenſe of horrour in

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the ſtomach and offend it. Now, if the Medicine do not raiſe a ſenſe of horrour in our ſtomachs, Nature would not uſe its utmoſt ſtrength to rid it ſelf of it, and would not reject together with it, the ill humours that made it ſick: for I think it is very probable, that it is by this means that moſt Medicines purge us.

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## Prob. 24.

*What is the reaſon that Children in Winter, though their face and hands ſeem to ſhow that they are more afflicted with cold than men grown, yet are not eaſily perſwaded to warm themſelves?*

Is it not becauſe to warm themſelves they muſt *ſtand ſtill* a good while in the ſame place, and that Children love to be conſtantly in *motion*, out of a kind of Impatience, which is natural to our ſpirit at that age?

age? Or elſe is it, that when they are cold and come nigh to the fire, its heat at firſt inſtead of comforting, doth more afflict them; which happens, becauſe it re-inforceth at firſt the cold of their bodies by an *Antiperiſtaſis*; and that as they want experience and reaſon, and follow the firſt ſentiment of nature, they reject this wholſom remedy for want of knowledge to judge, that by and by they ſhall find comfort by it? Or elſe is it, that though their bodies be more eaſily altered by the cold, then thoſe of full grown men, as it is plain to the eye; yet this alteration is not ſo painful and grievous to them; the reaſon of it is, becauſe the cold hurts chiefly by too much hardening and making ſtiff all the parts of our body, and that theirs are ſo tender and ſo ſoft, that by reaſon thereof, they cannot but very hardly be brought into the contrary extream?

PROB. 25.

*Whence comes it that when we are in affliction, we are better diverted by the representation of some Tragick History, or by the recital of some great misfortune, then by more merry shews, or facetious tales?*

IS it that the soul, being lively afflicted, shuns light and vain joyes, because that without truely comforting it, and without taking away the grounds of its affliction, they do only dilate the spirits by a superficial emotion of pleasure, with which they tickle the imagination, and that this dilatation of the spirits cannot be but offensive to the soul, if it still keeps its sadnesse at the bottom of the heart, since that it is for its good, and to the end that it may have the more strength, it keeps them together in affliction? Indeed

it seems to be for this reason chiefly, that the soul being thus afflicted, doth thus fly from gay and delightsome objects, and loves sad ones; just as a weak eye hates chearful and light colours; and on the contrary, loves such as are dark and have but little light. Or else, when we are profoundly afflicted, and are present at shows full of mirth, are we not displeased to see others laugh there with a most pure and perfect joy, because this doth more sadly put us in mind of our own misfortune: whereas in hearing read, or seeing acted a Tragick history we finde our selves lesse unhappy by considering the miseries befallen others? Or else, doth not the recital of other folks misfortune comfort us, chiefly for this reason, that for a time they take off our thoughts and affections to our selves, and fix them upon a forraign object? Or else, is it, that as they say nothing doth better drive out one love then another love? for

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the ſame reaſon nothing doth better expell one ſad thought then another. Without doubt this reaſon is upon good ground, and to ſpeak more generally, when ever one deſires to take away from a man wholly and for ever, any ſtrong paſſion, one ſhould endeavour to put him firſt into ſome other paſſion that is nigh it. For when we have wrought any change in a mind that had given it ſelf up through length of time to ſome certain inclinations, we may after that bring him to what we pleaſe; as we ſee that when a man hath moved a ſtone a little out of its place, which long lying had faſtened to the earth, afterwards he draws it whither he pleaſes; Or elſe the ſadneſſe which Tragedies and other ſuch like ſpectacles beget, is it not more apt to diminiſh afflictions, then are other things more ſportful, for this univerſal reaſon, That an evil is alwayes more eaſily cured by another evil, then by a good, which

happens thus, becauſe to go from evil to good is a longer way, and muſt receive a greater change then to paſſe from one evil to another.

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## PROB. 26.

*Why do ſome noiſes make a man ſleep?*

IS it that noiſes which one hears near at hand being only a *motion* of the *air*, or at leaſt ſuch as cannot be formed unleſs the air be moved, do excite ſome *motion* in the organs of the *brain*, by ſtriking the air encloſed in the ears; and that this motion being very proper to hinder the operation of the ſpirit, makes a man ſleep? Or elſe, doth not the noiſe of wind or rain, or of a ſpring make us ſleep, by *delighting* us? And therefore we ſee alſo that many fall aſleep more eaſily when they make ſome part of their body be rubbed, through the *pleaſure* that comes

comes of it; and that children also sleep sooner and with the more facility, when we rock them, because they *love* to be rocked? Indeed, that *pleasure* may help to produce sleep, methinks may further be proved, in that they which are in a great and profound pleasure, whether of body or of mind, do shut their eyes, stretch their arms carelesly, and continue in the same posture, as if they were really asleep, and that we say pleasure puts a man as it were into a sound. But why hath Pleasure this property to be more apt to cause sleep then the other passions of the soul? Is it not that the passions being necessarily either pleasures, or griefs, or desires, or hopes, or fears, the soul that hopes, or fears, or desires, or suffers, is in solliciteude, and seaches every thing, and therefore it sets its reason on work, and so hinders it self of being seized by sleep, whereas when it is in pleasure, it searches after nothing, being

content with the present, and therefore its reason ceases to act, and by ceasing to act causes sleep to ensue; just as Night comes when the Sun ceaseth to shine. Besides, noises that tickle the ear, do make us sleep, not only because they give us *pleasure*, but also because this pleasure is altogether *sensual*. For a *spiritual pleasure* makes us imploy our *reason*, and so keeps up within us this *internal light* of the mind, which doth no lesse hinder us from sleeping then an *external* light which strikes upon our eyes; and on the contrary, a pleasure meerly *corporal*, is an obstacle to *meditation*. But why of sensual pleasures doth that of *hearing* produce sleep? Is it not because it is that only which we can admit in an intire repose of the whole body, and without doing any thing on our part? For, for example, the pleasures that come from delightful *savours*, cannot be tasted without moving the tongue and jaws; and

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we cannot also well enjoy a good *odour* if we do not make some effort to draw it in and smell it, nor can we well admit the pleasures of the *eye* without turning the eyes this way and that, and without straining to hold them open, by drawing back towards the forehead the skin that covers them: but to *Hear* you cannot say we should need to do any such thing; Or else may we not explain this *Problem* thus, that a pleasant noise which strikes the Ear, produceth first a suspension and cessation of all other thoughts, by that sweetnesse which charms us, and afterwards takes from us even the sence of it self: because an object that hath been long present to the faculty, strikes it no more, and is not perceived; which appears in that *Custom* is so proper to render both good and bad things insensible to us, and that he which hath long had his mind fixt upon a work, that he composes, becomes unable to judge

rightly of it, untill he hath for a while given his mind ſome other object? But why muſt the noiſes which make one ſleep, be in ſome ſort *uniform*? and why, for inſtance, doth the noiſe of a *ſpring*, becauſe it is all of one kind, make us ſleep better then of a *muſical inſtrument*, which yet is more ſweet? Is it that in noiſes which are not uniform, the ſame object is not alwaies preſent to the faculty, that they have in them *grave* or *ſharpe* ſounds, *high* or *low*, *ſlower* or *ſwifter* ones; whereas in noiſes that are uniform, it is preciſely the ſame object which is alwayes preſent to the facu'ty, and that by this means it may, after it hath effaced all other objects of our thoughts, efface it ſelf alſo, and make it ſelf imperceivable, by the continuance of its action, as we ſaid, and ſo beget ſleep? Or elſe is it that the pleaſure which is given us by the noiſe of a brook or a fountain, is a pleaſure purely *ſenſual*, and of the ear

ear only; but that the pleaſure, which the harmony of a muſical inſtrument creates, is not a pleaſure of the ear only, but alſo of the *imagination* and of the *memory*, ſince that a man muſt compare in it one concord with another, and conſider the proportion of the ſounds to one another, to diſlike or approve it; and that ſeeing it exerciſeth the fancy and the memory, it is not to be wondred, if it be not ſo proper to make a man ſleep?

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## Prob. 27.

*What is the reaſon we aggravate our miſeries, and love to perſwade others that we are very unfortunate?*

IF we ſearch why we aggravate our misfortunes, we cannot deceive our ſelves in ſaying it is to perſwade others that we are very unfortunate.

But

But it is a greater difficulty to know for what reason we desire they should believe so, because oftentimes they are persons that we do not hope to receive any succour from, and that our very misery rendring us lesse able to be useful to others, may hinder many base and mercenary minds from doing us any good. To enquire then the cause of this humour of the afflicted; is it not, in the first place, that they are never assured that any man may not for the future be in a capacity to help him; and therefore they tell their misfortunes to all they see, and aggravate them to them, to the end that if hereafter they should discover any means to succour them, the pitty which they have raised in them, may presently produce its effect? Or else do they desire to have all that come near them know their evil, and believe it to be very great, thereby to incite them to give them some consolation? Or do they not hope, that he to whom they have

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aggravated their misery, if he be not able to help them, may at the least pray for them, and that these prayers may prevail with the divine goodnesse? Or else, do they not desire that those very persons from whom they cannot hope for any succour, should bemoane them, for that they think that some body else that shall have the means to deliver them from their miseries, will do it so much the more willingly, if he sees that many persons do compassionate him, and are affected therewith, because the more general the good is which we are intreated to do, and the more persons it regards, the more ready are we to do it? Or else is it that *to be beloved* being in it self a good, we do therefore exaggerate our miseries, thereby to raise pitty, and by pitty love, because we know naturally that pitty is so near to love, that there is nothing more easie then to slip from one to the other? Or else, do we not desire that a man should

believe,

believe that we ſuffer very much, becauſe we deſire he ſhould talk much and long of us, both while we live and after our death, and that we foreſee that men will talk ſo much the more of us, as they think that our miſeries have been great? Or is it not out of a vain affectation of glory which is annexed to conſtancy, and to be in ſome ſort admired by others, that we paint forth as very exceſſive, incomparable, and in a word, much greater then they are, the evils which men ſee we ſuffer with ſo much patience, our Vanity being ſo eſſential and united to our ſouls, that Grief it ſelf cannot expell it, and that that accompanies it even in the midſt of torments, upon the Rack, and at the Stake, as the *Stoicks* ſaid of their Wiſemans Happineſſe? Or elſe, do we aggravate our miſeries, becauſe through humane weakneſſe, we do in our miſeries many times think that the Providence which governs the Univerſe,

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doth us ſome kind of wrong, and that to prove it, we dare not alledge our perfections, and our innocence; but we alledge only the evils which it ſends us, which we ſay are greater then all that ever man ſuffered? Or elſe, becauſe we believe that all things have their courſe in the world, and ſucceed one another; do we not for this reaſon delight to perſwade our ſelves, that we have been for the time paſt very unhappy, to the end that we may build upon this foundation hopes of being happy for the future, and of ſeeing our felicity return in its courſe, as the Day returns after Night, Summer after Winter, and Fair weather after a long Storm? Or as *Caſar* very wiſely painted forth to his Souldiers the enemies forces much greater then they were, to the end that afterwards ſeeing them leſſe, they ſhould leſſe fear them, and be provided of reſolution and courage more then enough; doth not our ſoul by a

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like artifice fain to its self its misfortunes greater then they are, to the end that afterwards returning to consider the truth of the businesse, it may receive some comfort in undeceiving its self; and that when the violence of its evil shall return to oppresse it, it may have laid in a large provision of courage, and find its self provided of more constancy then is requisite for the undergoing of it? Or else do we not aggravate our miseries, to provoke our selves to *weep* more abundantly, because we finde that *tears* are a refreshment to us; and therefore also in Tragedies, afflicted persons do commonly exhort one another to shed abundance of Tears? Or else, to conclude, do we thus aggravate our evils, because we think that great and excellent things, having only great destinies, either in good or evil, it is some token of elevation and excellence to have been exercised by great evils? If any man

object to me, that herein we ſhould make but a ſimple conſequence; I do freely confeſſe it; but I believe he will alſo grant me, that the mind of man hath very many weakneſſes and follies, and eſpecially that he is ſo paſſionate for his own excellence, that he lets not ſlip by in vain the leaſt ſhaddow of the leaſt mark that he can give to himſelf of it. And therefore we ſee many men blame themſelves for having a bad memory, that from thence they may draw ſome advantage for their judgement, becauſe though they ſee this conſequence cannot but be very weak, ſince that there are everywhere thouſands of blockheads that have neither memory nor judgement, yet they think that this is ſome ſlight ſign of it, becauſe of an opinion that is received by many to this purpoſe, the truth whereof we do not here examine: and that which is yet more, you pleaſe men, if you only tell them that they have an

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head made like some very able man, whom every body reverences and esteems; nay they please themselves to believe they resemble him in their hair, or gate; or, briefly, in having any air of his, nay to believe that they have had a destiny like to his, and like success in certain encounters. For, as in judgements of Law-suits, there are some things which being not able to pass for entire proofs, do pass for semiproofs, or yet for less; so our soul in the midst of reasons, by which it labours to prove its own excellence, receives very vain ones, not as entire proofs, but as things which being collected and amassed in a sufficient large number, do give it means to flatter it self with some fancy which is advantageous to it, and to attribute to it self very likely some perfection.

## Prob. 28.

*Why do many laugh to see another man fall?*

There are some who propounding this Question, answer in one word, that it is out of malice. And if a man object to them, that many of those that laugh at such a mischance, do not cease to have very honest minds, and a great deal of true goodness: They might answer, that a soul really good, may yet have, together with its goodness, some light mixture of malice; as we see there is scarcely a man so wise that hath not some light weakness of spirit: As when we say a man is sanguine, we do not mean that he hath not a drop of Phlegm, Choler, or Melancholy humour in his body, but only that sanguine is predominant in him; so when we say a man

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is wise, good, or ingenuous, we are not bound to conceive him exempt and wholly purged from folly and vice; For in truth it signifits no more then that Wisdom, Vertue and Ingenuity are his predominant qualities: Nevertheless, it is clear that in those that laugh when they see one fall, it is not properly malice; which I inferr, not only because they do not laugh if he take any considerable hurt, but also and chiefly because they are as ready to laugh at themselves, if by chance they burn or cut their own fingers; or if the wind blow their hats off, or if they are surprized, or caught with a shower before they can get any shelter, or if any other petty disorder befalls them, the reason is, because these petty disorders have always in them something of *grotesque*, *extraordinary* and *sudden*; and because by these three qualities they do in some sort tickle the imagination.

PROB.

## Prob. 29.

*What is the reason that those who embrace Civil and Worldly affairs with too violent an ardour, are subject to lose all sense of Religion, and the knowledge of a Deity?*

THough we had not learnt from the authority of the Holy Scriptures, that the care of the things of the world, and the deceit of riches, do blind the understandings of men in respect of the mysteries of Faith, experience would sufficiently prove it; since that it happens even at this day very frequent, that those which settle their affections too much on the affairs of the world, and have in their minds no other desigrs but of worldly advancements, do so lose the sense of the verities of Religion that there remains to them only an outward profession of it, with which,

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as with a ſuperficial kind of beauty, they cover the irregularity of their opinions. To ſay from hence, that they wiſh there were no true Riligion, that they might give themſelves the more liberty to compleat their deſigns all manner of wayes, and that they labour all they can to perſwade themſelves of it, and at laſt do perſwade themſelves, it is to ſay very much, but perhaps not altogether enough, becauſe many times it happens that the more we deſire to chaſe out of our minds a belief, the leſs able are we to do it: It muſt therefore be added further, that as thoſe who addict themſelves to the contemplation of things ſublime and abſtract, do become unfit for low things, ſuch as are the affairs of the world: So by the ſame reaſon, thoſe that exerciſe their minds too much about low things, and ſuch as fall under the eye, muſt become unfit for the diſcerning of ſublime things, for that our ſoul is ſo miſerable

able that it can hardly gain on one ſide but it loſes on the other, and its perfections do very often ſhock one againſt another, and are incompetible. But beſides theſe two reaſons, there is a third more nice and not ſo eaſily to be perceived. The better to comprehend it, we muſt firſt conſider, that when our eyes have been too long fixed upon the Sun, there do remain upon them ſome certain impreſſions, which make us think we ſee its image in all the objects we look on: So when our mind is ſtrongly faſtened upon the conſideration of any one object, it thinks that it ſees it everywhere elſe, and is alſo ready to believe that every one looks upon that which he doth with a great deal of earneſtneſs, as he that hath long turned round, believes that all things turn with him. Thus, for example, a man of an *Amorous* complexion, all whoſe deſires look only at Love, is apt to think that all things in the world are

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which he is too much addicted.

## Prob. 30.

*What is the reason that the lowest spirits are commonly most perswaded of the truth of their opinions?*

IS it not because that as the earth and gross bodies have this advantage over the noblest and most subtile ones, that they are more firm in their places, and cannot so easily be removed; so gross and dull souls have certain advantages over others, amongst which this must be reckoned to be firm in their opinions? Or should we not rather say that this is rather a disadvantage to them, and that it is harder to take away their errours, then to take from wise men their sound belief; for the same reason that makes it harder to cure a man of a disease

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than to make him ſick? Or elſe, is it not that as a man that ſtands on tiptoes, cannot be ſo firm in this poſture as he is in that lies along and keeps himſelf with all his weight on the ground: So wiſe men cannot be ſo firm in their opinions, to which they came only by forcing and ſtraining themſelves; as fools are in theirs, into which they ſuffered themſelves to fall as it were with all their weight, being far from ſtriving to raiſe themſelves up again? Or elſe, is it that baſe opinions are upheld by the ſuffrage of the multitude, and that it is not to be wondered at, if that makes us couragiouſly embrace an opinion, ſince it makes us without fear to run upon death, and aſſures us againſt the greateſt dangers? Or elſe laſtly, is it that fools for want of judgement, do not for the moſt part underſtand the reaſon of the able; and that on the contrary, able men do by their vivacity conceive the reaſons which fools object

undertaken for Love; that it is this which for the moſt part playes his own game under the maſque of Ambition, or ſome other paſſion; and that even wars, and all the greateſt troubles of State, are only the effects of ſome ſecret Love. But an *Ambitious* man, out of the love he bears to Glory, takes it quite otherwiſe, and believes rather that all is done out of Ambition; that Covetouſneſs it ſelf looks at that indirectly; that Learning, as well as War, aims at nothing elſe; and that in Love it ſelf, the Ambition to conquer the mind of a Miſtriſs, or to ſurmount a Rival, are our principal motives. A *Souldier* will be ready to think that Learning hath no other rational end but the Military Art; but on the contrary a *Scholler* will judge that War hath no other end but to provide that wiſe men may quietly and peaceably apply themſelves to contemplation. An *Orator* will tell you that Philoſophy was invented only

only to move the passions of the Judges handsomly and with a dress. But on the contrary, a *Philosopher* will rather judge that Eloquence hath no other end but the application of Philosophie. It follows then, according to the preceding Doctrine, that when a man that hath already a propension to impiety, hath the affairs of the world too much in his head, and the means by which they are brought about; and he thinks, night and day, of nothing but politick tricks and gins by which he may entrap others; This imagination by little and little becomes plausible to him: That Religion it self is an artifice that tends to the bringing about of these very affairs of the world; and that it is a State-device of the Politicians, because he thinks that every one looks upon that which himself doth with abundance of affection, and thinks he sees everywhere else the same objects which his own mind is filled with, and to

which

which he is too much addicted.

## Prob. 30.

*What is the reason that the lowest spirits are commonly most perswaded of the truth of their opinions?*

IS it not because that as the earth and gross bodies have this advantage over the noblest and most subtile ones, that they are more firm in their places, and cannot so easily be removed, so gross and dull souls have certain advantages over others, amongst which this must be reckoned to be firm in their opinions? Or should we not rather say that this is rather a disadvantage to them, and that it is harder to take away their errours, then to take from wise men their sound belief; for the same reason that makes it harder to cure a man of a disease

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than to make him ſick? Or elſe, is it not that as a man that ſtands on tiptoes, cannot be ſo firm in this poſture as he is in that lies along and keeps himſelf with all his weight on the ground: So wiſe men cannot be ſo firm in their opinions, to which they came only by forcing and ſtraining themſelves; as fools are in theirs, into which they ſuffered themſelves to fall as it were with all their weight, being far from ſtriving to raiſe themſelves up again? Or elſe, is it that baſe opinions are upheld by the ſuffrage of the multitude, and that it is not to be wondered at, if that makes us couragiouſly embrace an opinion, ſince it makes us without fear to run upon death, and aſſures us againſt the greateſt dangers? Or elſe laſtly, is it that fools for want of judgement, do not for the moſt part underſtand the reaſon of the able; and that on the contrary, able men do by their vivacity conceive the reaſons which fools object

against them, better then they do themselves, and that this difference is alike proper to make those more resolute, and to weaken something the assurance of these?

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## Prob. 31.

*Whence is it that in the greatest subjects of affliction, we do many times take up more readily a constant resolution, then in others that are much lighter?*

IT is principally for two causes. First, that when we are much afraid of any misfortune, and look upon it as the greatest that can happen to us, this fear makes us very often to think of it; so that when it befalls us, we are already prepared for it, and that for this reason many times we are more easily resolute therein, contrary to the expectation of all men. The second is that

that a great misfortune disabuses us of the too great esteem which we set on the things of the world, and of the happiness which may be gotten in it, and proves to us on the contrary by our own experience, that all things are very fickle and inconstant. Thus then it makes us contemn it, and by that great blow which it gives us, doth as it were cut the roots by which we were tyed unto it: In a word, by afflicting us on the one side, it comforts us on the other, and furnishes us with weapons against it self.

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## Prob. 32.

*Wherefore are old men great talkers?*

Old men have thoughts that vex and perplex them, when they come once to be entertained with much leisure; either because they have discovered vanity in all things;

or becauſe old age in which they are, ſets before their eyes as ſoon as they entertain themſelves in this manner, many grand incommodities, into which they are ready to fall, and läſtly, the moſt inevitable of all evils, which is Death. They ſeek therefore to divert their minds from theſe vexatious thoughts by all means, and hither tend their houſhold cares, to which, for this reaſon, they apply themſelves very earneſtly; but when they have nothing to do, they can only Hear, or Talk, or Read, to hinder that melancholy which their mind would give to it ſelf in too great a leſure. But *Hearing* is not ſufficient to divert their minds from thoughts that wound them, becauſe governing themſelves wholly by their own judgement, they give no great attention to the thonghts of others, or contemn them, as making account that they themſelves have others taken up upon better grounds. As for *Reading*, it is an employment,

ployment, which beſides that it is hurtful for them, dulls their faculties, which Age hath rendred leſs quick, becauſe it hath nothing that doth enough affect the ſenſes and the mind. It is then only when they *Talk* that their minds do in good earneſt loſe the image of thoſe things that afflict and trouble them, and diverts the ſight from every thing that inſpires it with melancholy. It is not therefore to be wondered at, if they are much delighted therewith. Or elſe, as *Fruit* falls more eaſily from the tree when it is ripe: ſo our *Conceits* come more fluently from us, how careful ſoever we be to keep them in, when they are full ripe, and that we have cleared and well digeſted them. Now old mens are ſuch, becauſe they are wiſe, and have made many reflections, which have diſabuſed them of many errours. Or elſe, laſtly, they are Talkers, for ſeveral particular reaſons, as for inſtance, if they are

preſent at any ſolemnity or great ſhow, they have then leſs curioſity then others, becauſe they have often ſeen the like; therefore, inſtead of being attentive to ſee; they ſuffer themſelves often to make large diſcourſes, which being then very offenſive to thoſe that are near them, hath ſo much the more eaſily gotten them the name of great Talkers. Juſt ſo alſo, if they are at a Feaſt, they have leſs appetite then others, and are ſooner ſatisfied. And therefore, were it only out of civility, they are obliged to Talk, which incommodating thoſe that by this means ſee themſelves bound to make long replyes, makes them ſo much the more blame this vice. Moreover, after the repaſt, they are alſo carried away with a deſire to Talk much, to keep themſelves from ſleeping, becauſe they know well it is a thing they are ſubject to. Theſe are then, it ſeems, the principal cauſes of the effect we ſpeak of, though there may be alſo many others.

PROB.

## PROB. 33.

*Whence comes it, that in all kind of things, those that do but meanly in them, are more severe and rigid Judges of others, then those that excell therein, and hold the first rank?*

DO not people very much deceive themselves, when they think that to *dislike all things*, is a token of *delicacy of judgement*; whereas on the contrary, they should say, that a squeamishness both in body and mind, is a sign of sickness; and as an healthful man likes well brown bread, and less delicate viands; so a spirit of a strong and vigorous health, ought to be pleased with all things, wherein it sees shine never so little of perfection, although it will perceive the difference that is betwixt them and others; which be-

ſing thus ſuppoſed, our Problem remains without difficulty; Or elſe ſhall we ſay, that the inclination eaſily to condemn others, proceeds from rudeneſs, and a want of natural ſweetneſs, which is not to be found in minds that have an entire and perfect beauty, becauſe it is a great uglineſs; as on the contrary, it is a great part of the beauty of the mind to have ſweet and gentle thoughts, to be ready to excuſe the faults of others, and not to contemn any one? Or elſe as we ſee often, that *petty Lords* are leſs accoſtable than the *great ones*, and maintain a gravity fuller of pride, becauſe their authority being not ſo well founded as that of theſe later, they think they muſt thus uphold it, by ſurly and arrogant looks, and by a brutiſh impudence: Is it not juſt ſo in the meaner wits, and do they not uſe this ſeverity to condemn others, for to ſeparate themſelves thereby from the common, and labour to maintain

tain the authority they usurp, and which they perceive hath not footing and *basis* enough to uphold it self? Or else as *subordinate Judges*, are very often more severe and rigorous in their judgements then the *Soveraigns*, because it is not in their power to remit any thing of the severity of the Law: the meaner wits, are they not more hard many times to excuse a thing that is against the ordinary rules, because it is for great minds only to grant a dispensation from those rules upon certain occasions; and because those that have meaner abilities, ought not to be bold therein, nor are they, for fear, lest whiles they desire to excuse others, they be blamed themselves? Or else is it, that meaner spirits are not willing to confess in others a moderate worth, because it is troublesom to have many companions; but that when a man doth *excell* in some kind of thing, he is glad that many others do but *meanly*

in it, because it is glorious and delightful to have a great many *inferiours*? Or is it not, lastly, because great spirits love the truth more, and have more of ingenuity and of good breeding to acknowledge the perfection that is in another, and to publish it with all sincerity: but the meaner sort are not alwayes capable of so pure and clean a candour, and do many times dissemble their judgements upon some design? It is certain indeed, that many petty passions which they cannot rid themselves of, are capable to alter their good nature, and hinder them from confessing with sufficient magnanimity anothers worth. For sometimes they will not confess it out of an appetite of *revenge*, which some slight words hath raised in them; sometime they refuse to do it out of some motion of *emulation* and *envy*; sometimes it is not properly out of *envy* that they are loth to own a merit far above their own, but because so *high*

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a perfection doth more plainly discover to them their own *littleness*, and by this means makes them sad. Or else it may be, if they have once begun to blame a thing, they will not *unsay* it out of *obstinacy*, and lest they acknowledge they were deceived. Or else, they will not confess that another hath any worth, out of fear lest somebody should thence inferr by a long consequence, that they themselves have none: Or if they have no interest to obscure anothers glory, there will be some *friend* of theirs, or else some one that is of the same *City*, or of the same *Countrey*, or of the same *Party* that they are, whom this interest will concern, and they will not preferr before him one that is *indifferent*, or a *stranger*, or of a *contrary Party*. In a word, there are besides many other causes more slight and more nice, which change the candour of their words, and make them deny, either in whole or in part, the perfection

fection of another: but great minds are free from theſe weakneſſes, and undefiled with this filth, becauſe they are leſs intereſſed, and therefore worth finds more equity at their hands, and is more eaſily owned.

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## PROB. 34.

*Whence comes it that it is ſo eaſie to blame and find fault, that the leaſt able do it beſt; and that it is much more hard to commend?*

IS it not becauſe there is much more ill than good in humane things, and that thoſe which are the moſt perfect, are yet very imperfect, if a man examine them ſtrictly, and with a deſire to find fault? But this being ſuppoſed, that the moſt perfect things in this world have very great defects: Whence comes it that the meaneſt wits do take notice of them much more eaſily then they do

do the perfections? Is it not because being ill-sighted, they see only that which exceeds, and is very great in the subjects they examine, and that as we said, the evil doth alwayes exceed? Or else, doth not the imperfection of the objects more lively affect the mind, than their perfection; for the same reason that that which hurts our bodies, is much more lively felt, then that which delights them? Or else is it, that to acknowledge worth, and to commend it, one must first know wherein the perfection and truth of things consists; but that to know and to prove that another man is not arrived at it, one needs only know wherein they do not consist. Indeed this reason seems to be most true, and to be able sufficiently to clear the difficulty of this *Problem*. For it is so easie to say wherein things do not consist, that after this manner we know the nature of *God* himself, since that being ignorant *what he is*, we do never-

neverthelesſ know him by *negation*, and we know that he is not any thing *material*, any thing *viſible*, any thing *mortal*, and that he is *incapeable of change*, and of the leaſt *defect*; ſo that without being able to deſcribe his greatneſs, we can eaſily blame and reprove thoſe that ſpeak too lowly of him. After the ſame manner, it is very eaſie to tell where the *Center of a circle* is not, and the leaſt child can point out with his finger many places which are not the middle of it: but to know where it is, there is need of skill, time, and inſtruments. But if we muſt ſtill ſearch out another reaſon for the ſame effect, conſiſts it not in this, that as one that ſwims is carryed by the very ſame water which he ſtrikes, which he thruſts from him, and which he troubles: ſo he that reproves and combates any one, and doth all he can to decry him, is born up by his inventions, becauſe that he affirms nothing of himſelf, and doth only

maintain

maintain that, what he whom he cenſures ſayes, being ſuppoſed, ſuch and ſuch things do follow: So that by this means he diſcourſes oftentimes ſucceſsfully of many things which he underſtands not, nor ſees the grounds of. Truly it ſeems to be ſo; For, for inſtance, though I know not what a *Half-moon*, a *Counterſcarpe*, or a *Baſtion* is, it is clear notwithſtanding, that when he that diſcourſes of them before me, ſhall come to contradict himſelf, either directly or indirectly, I may in uſing theſe terms which I underſtand not, reproach to him his contradictions, fight againſt him with thoſe arms which he hath put into my hands, and appear more able and more underſtanding by this cenſure of him, then indeed I am. On the contrary, to commend any one with ſucceſs, one muſt not ſuppoſe for true, any thing that he ſaies, but muſt prove and maintain it by reaſons fetcht elſwhere.

PROB.

## Prob. 35.

*What is the reason that when the Winter hath been very cold, they commonly say the Summer that follows will be very hot?*

There are sometimes some slight things, the clearing whereof fails not to bring some light to our common sense, and in this number one may reckon this, which at first sight hath some difficulty, by reason that one would think the quite contrary, that if the Winter hath very much cooled the Earth and Air, they should be the more difficultly heated by the following Summer. Is it therefore quite otherwise, that the heat of the Summer finding the earth and air very cold, doth redouble its violence by the opposition of its contrary? Or else do they say so, because they see that one contrary doth

doth naturally succeed another in the same degree; as for example the water doth naturally ascend as much as it hath descended; the excess of heat in a feaver ariseth to the same violence with the excess of cold; great friendships leave behind them great enmities; and great displeasures, when they end, produce extream contentments; after an extraordinary cloudy and wet season, we enjoy an extraordinary serenity and purity of air, and much fairer then that which went before it; and one that is recovered from a great sickness, hath commonly better health then he had before, and recovers a soundness that is more firme and of a greater value, then that which he had lost. Or else is it that when the Winter hath been extraordinary cold, it hath also been necessarily dry, by the same reason the earth being very dry is disposed to receive a great heat? Or else that when it hath been long cold, it is a sign, that

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the matter of the cold and Northern wind, or of the other cauſes that do cool the air, is ſpent for a long time, and therefore it is likely it will be very hot?

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## Prob. 36.

*What is the reaſon that Fear makes ones hair ſtand on end?*

For the clearing of this Problem, I think it is needful to conſider in the firſt place that *Admiration* and *Fear* have ſome affinity, and do often accompany one another. Which being ſo, it ſeems that as *Admiration* makes a *Chilneſs* run through ones whole body, by reaſon that it brings into the ſoul a certain ſhadow of *Fear*. So *Fear* makes the hair ſtand on end, out of ſome mixture of *Admiration*. Indeed this ſeems ſo much the more probable, becauſe the frights which make the

the hair ſtand on end, muſt ſpring from a danger whoſe image preſently ſtrikes the ſoul, and yet it knows no cauſe of it, and that thoſe frights which come upon us when we think we ſee dead men, or Ghoſts, or Devils, do chiefly produce this effect, becauſe they are not only *fearful* things, but alſo very *admirable*, as being ſupernatural. *Virgil* hath excellently well comprized this; for when he would expreſſe the *Fear* which the ghoſt of his wife *Creuſa* ſtrook into *Æneas*, the prodigy of *Polydorus's* tomb, the arrival of *Mercury*, that came to bring him a meſſage from *Jupiter*; or the *Fear* that *Turnus* was in, ſeeing an infernal monſter flap his buckler with its wings: upon all theſe occaſions he puts down this circumſtance, that their hair ſtood up right, becauſe that all theſe things were as *Admirable* as *terrible*: But in other kinds of fear, he is contented to mention only *coldneſs* and *trembling*.

And

And if any demand of me why *Admiration* makes the hair to ſtand up right? I anſwer, that the ſoul, having its faculties intent on the conſideration of that which appears admirable, doth alſo contract the organs of the brain, and with them the skin that covers the head. Now a man may eaſily imagine that we cannot contract this skin, but by pulling it up, nor pull it up but the hairs will ſtare a little. It is true that the motion of *fear* doth alſo contribute thereto, becauſe it makes one *cold*, and that a part of our body cannot be *cold* without being a little more contracted then before.

PROB.

PROB. 37.

*Whence comes it that many being in a frenzy, have spoke Latin or Greek, without having ever learned either of these languages?*

MAny of those that have examined this Question, endeavouring to rid themselves of the great difficulty which it presents at first to the mind, have in my judgement made use of such answers, as are more against all appearance of reason, then the Question it self, and given us remedies worse then the disease: For they would give such strange force to our imagination, that no man of a sound judgement is able to give credit to their vain discourses. Wherefore omiting all that they have said of it, we will search only amongst known causes, according to our custom, the reason

reaſon of ſo marvellous an effect. *Firſt* then it is remarkable, that thoſe words, which many being in a frenzy have pronounced in a tongue which they knew not, have been ordinarily *Latin* or *Greek*, or ſometimes *Hebrew*, according to the report of thoſe that have treated of them. In the *ſecond* place I ſuppoſe that the words which they have thus ſpoken, did not make any diſcourſe that was coherent or that was pertinent to that which was asked them, ſince that the tranſports of their frenzy hindred them from diſcourſing rationally. Theſe two things being thus ſuppoſed, one may add, that although thoſe that have ſpoken *Latin*, *Greek*, or *Hebrew* in a frenzy, never *ſtudied* it, and yet they eaſily may have heard thoſe words before which they ſpoke, ſeeing that theſe three languages are commonly taught throughout *Europe*, and that private houſes and thoſe places which are ſet apart for

ſpeaking

ſpeaking in publick, do very often retain them. Now it is poſſible that theſe words, at the ſame time when they heard them, made ſome impreſſion in the organs of their memories, which through its weakneſs did not appear to them, untill they fell into madneſs; becauſe that the heat of the frenzy by its immoderate ſubtilizing of the ſpirits of the brain, renders the ſenſe of the imagination ſo quick and ſo delicate, that there cannot be in its organs any impreſſions ſo weak which it diſcovers not and is lively enough affected with it. And that the images of certain things can lodge in our memories, and we have no knowledge of them at all, becauſe they are only painted very weakly, and as it were with dead colours, may ſufficiently be proved by *Reminiſcence*, which brings to our minds many things which we thought we had utterly forgotten. Beſides many otherlike impreſſions,

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are also made oftentimes in the other organs of our faculties, and we never perceive it; and it is not to be doubted, for example, but that when the weather is about to change, our bodies, although we perceive nothing on it, do receive within them some change, as well as those of birds that thereby do presage fair or foul weather. In the *third* place, one may confess that certain images may be imprinted in our organs without being perceived, after the example of a man that is very short-sighted, who doth questionless, for all that, receive the images of objects very far distant, because that he would see them if on a suddain, the power which he hath of seeing should become more subtile and quick. And if any man wonders not that these freneticks we speak of, are able to retain, and conserve a long time in their memories the images which they do not know are there, but that the words which they

they heard only by the by, ſhould be able to leave there any light and weak picture of themſelves. He muſt remember that beſides that the organs of the memory are without doubt very delicate, and very ſuſceptible of all impreſſions, the activity of natural things is marvellous, and hath many times much greater extent then we believe. For, for example, could we eaſily perſwade our ſelves, that a beaſt that runs can in running imprint its ſent in all the places where it goes, if the dogs of chaſe did not prove it; and when we have handled a ring of glaſs, or ſilver, or gold, would we believe at the firſt, that ſo ſmall touching of it ſhould take away any thing from it: and yet Philoſophers hold that it muſt needs be ſo, ſince that at length we diminiſh it ſenſibly by handling it? I add further that it is not neceſſary, that the perſons we now ſpeak, of ſhould have heard thoſe words they pronounce in their

frenzy, only once; they may have heard them two or three ſeveral times, and a man muſt the leſs wonder that we have the images of things without knowing it, when he conſiders that our very deſires are hidden from us, when they are as yet very feeble, and newly born.

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## PROB. 38.

*What is the reaſon that a too earneſt entreaty makes us unwilling inſtead of inciting us to grant that which is deſired of us?*

IS it not becauſe man being a rational creature and one that ought to act freely, loves to lead himſelf the dance in all his actions and to have the beginning of them in himſelf; and that when one deſires to conſtrain him with too much ardour and violence to any thing he thinks he is rather *drawn* by the ardour

ardour and preſſing importunity, then put upon it of *himſelf*, which conſequently diſpleaſes him, and makes his will more cold inſtead of heating it? Or elſe, is it becauſe he which begs of us earneſtly, makes us foreſee plainly enough, that we cannot deny him his deſire without putting him into a great choler, and making him our enemy, that is to ſay, that he provides for us his enmity, as it were a puniſhment in caſe we fail of compliance toward him, in which our mind ſees yet a greater image of conſtraint, and that which diſpleaſeth it more? for it hates nothing ſo much, as to ſeem to do a thing out of fear. Or elſe, is it becauſe we judge, that he which deſires a thing with immoderate and exceſſive paſſion, is apt to tell a lie to gain it, ſooner then another man that deſires it with leſs violence; and that he doth purpoſely conceal from us ſome circumſtance, which would make his requeſt unreaſonable, and

unjuſt? Or elſe, is it becauſe that which is very violently deſired, ſeems to us of more conſequence; and that in things of conſequence, we are wont to demur and conſider a good while before we reſolve any thing, becauſe we are affraid of committing ſome great errour? Or elſe is it becauſe he which prayes us with too much earneſtneſs, ſayes many things which make us believe that he hath his eye faſtened only upon his own intereſt, and that he regards only the good or evil that may happen to him upon our denyal or conſent, and not on the good or evil that may befall us, which we diſlike with ſome reaſon, as being unjuſt: for, according to equity and reaſon, he that would have us be diſpoſed to do good to him, ought alſo on his part to wiſh us well, and that in deſiring of us an act of good will towards him, he have not a will indifferent toward us? Or elſe laſtly, is it not becauſe too earneſt prayers and ſup-

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plications are commonly accompanied with too low and baſe a ſubmiſſion, and a too ſervile flattery, which commonly do quite contrary to that a man thinks they ſhould? It is manifeſt indeed that a too low and ſordid ſubmiſſion is apt to be contemned, and every one knows it well enough; but that which deceives men, is, that oftentimes they do not conſider long enough before the conſequences of this contempt, and ſee not that it not only extinguiſhes *Affection* in us, but alſo inclines us even to *Hatred*, juſt as *Pity* inclines us to *Love*. Beſides, the ſubmiſſion that any one renders to us, is not more apt to pleaſe us, and by this means to get ſome benefit of us, then to make us think it comes from a baſe and dejected mind, ſince that all the advantage we can finde in it, proceeds only from the mind that it comes from: and as for the exceſſive praiſes which are given us by him that deſires to

obtain some favour from us by his too base flattery, if we think that they do not come from the heart, we consider them only as so many cheats; and if we believe that he doth really esteem us, with that excess as he makes shew of, first, we do not much thank him for it, because the esteem which a man hath of any one, is a thing forced, and depends not on him that gives it; and in the second place, we do not now take so much care to preserve and augment this esteem in him by our benefits, as thinking it both great enough and well enough established, whereas when any one respects us, but with more moderation, we labour what we can to encrease this esteem by our beneficence, and take care to cherish and cultivate (as I may so say) a belief, which we see is both profitable and glorious to us.

PROB.

## Prob. 39.

*What are the causes of the marvelous things which we observe in the Silk-worm?*

TO say the truth, there is nothing so admirable as that which no body admires. Those which we call *occult qualities* in the Elements, or in other things, may have the most *common causes*, like Juglers tricks, which seem to be grand mysteries, before one hath discovered them: but *Man*, whose ordinary operations and common motions we do not at all admire, offers us nevertheless in these operations and motions far more worthy subjects of astonishment; his *Passions* are more admirable then the *ebbing* and *flowing of the sea*; the power of his *understanding* over his *Will*, more marvelous then the influence of the

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*Stars*; the operations of his *Senſes* are of much more difficult explication, then all thoſe of the *Loadſtone*; *and he is a great marvail that admires little ones.* Not to go too far in this diſcourſe, the conſideration of the marvels which are diſcovered in the Silk-worms, may furniſh us with ſome proofs of it: they ſeem at firſt ſight to ſurpaſs or equal the things that are moſt ſtrange; and thoſe that have deſcribed them, have not been able ſufficiently to admire that this creature ſhould be killed by the ſole noiſe of thunder, that it ſhould have an inſtinct to ſpin unprofitably, and even with the loſs of its life, ſeeing that it ſtifles it ſelf in its own work, that it can draw out of its body that Silk of which it compoſes it; that a long time after it is dead, it revives; that it transforms it ſelf into a Butterfly, and after it is thus transformed, it can live ſtill many dayes without meat, that is to ſay, to the end of its life. But how ſtrange ſoever

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all theſe things ſeem, I conceive that if we would conſider them ſomewhat exactly, we ſhould perſwade our ſelves, that there is no neceſſity of leaving the bounds of common and ordinary cauſes to unvail and clear the ſecrets of them; and to do it, I will lay down only two things; Firſt, that Silk-worms are exceſſive *cold*; and Secondly, that they are full, and as I may ſo ſay, overglutted with an exceſſive *moiſture*: their *moiſture* is apparent of its ſelf to our ſight, ſince that it makes them wholly tranſparent; and it is credible, that it is this that renders them ſo fruitful. Their extream *coldneſs* may alſo be felt by our hands, and doth beſides diſcover it ſelf by certain reaſons to our minds, ſeeing that in the midſt of Summer, if the weather come to be a little coldiſh, they dye with cold, which doth not befall any other creature; and ſeeing thoſe which take the pains to keep them, are carefull to keep them very warm,

and in a place that is not exposed to the Northwind. These two things being thus supposed, it is no wonder in the first place that the noise of thunder kills them; this manifestly proceeds from the fear which so terrible a noise causes in them; for they must needs be very fearful, since that they are so cold and are void of blood; and when fear adds its coldness to that which is natural to them, so violent an excess may easily deprive them of life. Now as the Silkworm is very cold, and when it begins to grow old, its natural frigidity by this means encreasing, it is not to be wondred at that it seeks to envelop and cover it self, to the end that it may be warm: for all other creatures being prest with cold, do the like, and search out holes wherein they lie in the straw, and enwrap themselves even in the cloaths and hangings of our houses, to be the less troubled with it. Hereto serves the Silk which it vomits,

mits, and we muſt not wonder that it can vomit this rich matter; for it is nothing but the remainders of its nouriſhment which its too weak heat cannot digeſt, and as it were a ſuperfluous humour which their abundance of it hath cauſed. Beſides, when it puts it forth, it is not dry, but viſcous, and hath a clammy moiſtneſs: but preſently after the air hardens and dries it, as if it were glue. Being thus covered for warmth, it is not ſtifled as folks believe; nature doth not give creatures any inſtincts that are ſo deſtructive to them. It dies not unleſs by a *natural* death for want of ſtrength, but rather it makes its *Bed* when we think it builds its *Sepulcher*, and *ſleeps* when we believe it *dyes*. And indeed, if we open this pretended grave, after that we believe it is dead, we ſhall clearly perceive that it is only in a profound ſleep; its natural frigidity, which even before it thus locked it ſelf up, cauſed it to

ſleep

ſleep longer then ordinarily other creatures do, making it ſleep much longer, ſince it lockt it ſelf up enveloped as it is in ſilk, which it wiſely drew out of its own body to caſt round about it; it grows a little warm by reaſon that its heat is on all ſides hindred from exhaling, and driven back, juſt as a man becomes warm by means of the cloaths he covers himſelf with. But whence comes it, you will ſay, that it tranſforms it ſelf into a Butterfly? I anſwer, that there is no colour to ſay it is *transformed*; that the Wings it acquires were due to it from its birth; that nature intended it ſhould flye with them: but that they could not grow out, untill that being covered with ſilk, which it vomited, it had gotten together a little more heat, to ſtrengthen its *vegetative* faculty, and enable it to put them forth, as it doth to that of *Trees*, to put forth their fruits, leaves and flowers, the production whereof

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was formerly hindred by the coldneſs of the Winter. Nor doth this happen only to *Silk-worms*; for *Caterpillers* ſpin the like upon trees, locking themſelves up in their own work, and being there, they get wings as well as theſe. But that which further proves to us, that the heat of the Silk-worm, uniting it ſelf, after the manner aforeſaid, may ſerve to put forth its wings, is, that *flying* Serpents are to be ſeen only in very *hot* Countries, by reaſon it ſeems, that the extream heat of the air, ſupplying the defect of the coldneſs of their temper, gives their formative faculty power to produce them. But if we muſt ſay that they are transformed, and that they change their nature in acquiring *wings*, becauſe that immediately after their birth they have none, we muſt for the ſame reaſon ſay, that many other creatures are transformed when they acquire *Teeth*, *Nails* or *Horns*, which they had

had not when they were born, and that the very birds are transformed when they get wings, ſince that when they were hatcht they had none. The Silk-worm therefore is not transformed, but only becomes able to fly ſomewhat ſlowlier; and to conclude my ſtory, it is reaſonable we ſhould believe, that after it hath ſlept much, the ſame cauſe that awakens other creatures, awakens this alſo: Then doth wiſe nature make it vomit forth a thin ſharp moiſture, which helps it to gnaw that ſilk, which it was on all ſides environed with, and by this means out it comes and continues for many dayes, and even to the end of its life, without eating any thing, wherein conſiſts the laſt marvel that we are to ſpeak of. But I conceive we may eaſily gueſs the cauſe of it, if we remember, that it hath a very great moiſture joyned with a very ſmall heat: for we ſhall ſee that this ſmall heat muſt finde

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for a long time ſufficient aliment in this great moiſture, without having need to receive any other; and hereupon might be alledged the ſtrange ſtory of a *German* maid, that having a very weak heat, and a body full of a viſcous and clammy humour, continued ſome whole years without eating or drinking. Now as this temper of the Silk-worm diſcovers to us the cauſe why it can live ſo long without meat: So this entire abſtinence, in which it paſſes a great part of its life, may be a new confirmation to us, that it hath the ſame temper which we attributed to it at firſt. For though for a certain ſeaſon it eats abundantly enough, of which there may be eaſily ſome other particular reaſon; yet conſidering its whole life in groſs, it muſt paſs for one of the ſobereſt creatures. Theſe are then, in my opinion, the cauſes of whatſoever appears marvelous in the

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Silk-worm, If any one hath a mind to think that there are more ſtrange and more occult ones, it is not my intent, that this diſcourſe ſhould hinder him; But yet I believe that as we oftentimes do not ſee many things becauſe they are too *far* diſtant from the eyes of our mind, ſo at other times we do not ſee them becauſe they are too *near*, and that we ſearch at the other end of the world for that which lyes before our noſes, and that the great eagerneſs that our underſtanding uſes to arrive at their cauſes, makes it go much beyond them.

PROB.

## PROB. 40.

*Why are good men often-times subject to a light promptitude of Choler?*

DO they not only seem to be so, because they are more free and open, and so know not how to dissemble the smallest anger, and least discontentments that arise in them; but let them presently appear in their eyes and words: whereas those that are less free, do conceal them what they can possibly? Or else, is it that those that have honest and good minds, are angry for many things that regard not their particular interests? as for example, for the glory of *God*, and for any thing that respects *Honesty* and *Piety*, so that as these are general things which come every moment into our discourse, ordinary conversation offers them more often occasion to speak with heat

heat and emotion, and in ſome ſort to be provoked: whereas a brutiſh man, to whom all things are indifferent except his own proper intereſt, can hear without any diſturbance, all kind of diſcourſe which he is not the ſubject of, be they never ſo ſtrange; which makes him often appear more ſweet and gentle, becauſe his intereſts being ſome particular things, and little known to others, they ſcarce ever come to be the matter of a common diſcourſe? Or elſe, may we not give light to this Problem, by that which *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that Choler is enclined to obey Reaſon, but that it obeyes it too ſoon, and ſtayes not until the firſt appearance of Reaſon hath given place to another more clear and ſolid? And may it not be ſaid, that if ſo, it muſt needs be, that good minds muſt naturally have ſome ſeeds of a light promptitude to Choler, becauſe the inclination readily to obey Reaſon, is without doubt a good diſpoſition.

ſition of mind, and a token of excellence, though by accident there may ariſe from it vitious actions and other inconveniencies? Or elſe, may we not add further, that one ſhall have leſs reaſon to wonder, that Good men have many times ſuch a diſpoſition, if it be conſidered, that there are ſome kinds of Anger ſo handſom, that one may maintain they mark out more of Goodneſs, Tenderneſs, and Love of good, than even motions of Pitty or Goodwill; becauſe in the motions of Affection and Pitty, the ſoul doth meerly deſire to do good; but thoſe of a generous and laudable Anger, are the motions of a ſoul that doth ſo much love good and hate evil, that it troubles it ſelf at it even to fury, and becomes fooliſh for a time? It may indeed be further alledged in favour of this Paradox, that the tenderneſs of nature of any creature appears not ſo much; for example, when it takes care to give food

food to its little ones, as when full of anger and as it were in a fury, it layes on load with its wings, or horns, or other arms that Nature hath given it, on thoſe that would come too near them. Or elſe, in concluſion we may ſay, that there are certain emotions of choler, in which a man hath no intentions to do any hurt to thoſe of whom he complains with ſharp words; but rather to incite them to produce their juſtifications, to be able to find them innocent, or leſs culpable, and to continue by this means to love them: ſo that as they do not proceed out of malice, but tenderneſs, there is no cauſe to wonder that good men are ſubject thereunto, and that they ſhew a good nature, like in this to Lightnings, that appear in Summer evenings, and are oftentimes ſigns of *fair* weather, whereas they ſhould ſeem rather to preſage *foul*.

PROB.

PROB. 41.

*Whence comes it that they ſay, The Love of Grand-fathers to their Grand-children, is greater then that of their Fathers?*

IS it not becauſe a man attains through longer cares to have a Grand-child, then to have a Son; and that alwayes that which we acquire through more care, is more dear to us? Or elſe, is not a Grand-child dearer, becauſe it hath been a long time deſired? Or elſe, do we not look upon it as a more rare favour, and ſuch as heaven communicates only to few perſons, which makes us love it the more, becauſe generally all rare things have a particular allurement for our minds? Or elſe, is not a Grand-child more beloved of his Grand-father then of his Father, becauſe that his Grand-father

father, as being more old, and nigher his death, doth for this reaſon deſire the more to live again in another? Or elſe, is it becauſe the love we bear to thoſe that proceed from us, ariſing from a deſire to extend our being ſucceſſively to many generations, he that by this natural courſe is more removed, ſhews to us this deſign more advanced, and ſo doth more touch our inclinations? Or elſe, is it becauſe the Father loves his Son only for his own ſake, but the Grand-father loves him for his own ſake and for his Sons ſake too, and ſees in him the image of himſelf, and of him whom he hath begotten, and that theſe two divers conſiderations do produce in him two divers tenderneſſes very powerful? Indeed this reaſon is very likely: for to go about to object, that the Father hath likewiſe two divers cauſes of loving his Son, becauſe he may love him for the Grand-fathers ſake, this makes nothing to the purpoſe;

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since that, as every one knows, the affection which blood inspires, hath much less force in ascending than in descending. But if still another reason must be given of this *Problem*, one may also say, that perhaps the affection of Grand-fathers doth only seem to be greater then that of Fathers, because the Son being in a more particular manner the very blood and substance of the Father; the Father for this reason thinks that to love him very much, is to love himself very much, and that therefore he conceals and keeps in these motions of it, for fear lest they betray too much weakness and self-love: Whereas a Grand-father being not so much touched with this consideration, doth the more give himself over to the violences of his Love, and dares more freely manifest it, as judging the excess thereof less shameful.

PROB. 42.

*Why is it that a rare and eminent Vertue which shines in a Prince, raises greater motions of Love in the lower sort of people, then in other men?*

IT is a thing worthy to be observed, that the vertue of a Prince when it is eminent and rare, seems to raise more Love in the lowest sort of people, then in any others. For we see it is commonly the vulgar people that appear most afflicted for the death of a good and vertuous Prince, even to weep in the streets, shops, and about the fields, with an extream tenderness, as it were for a domestique loss, and it is also the meaner sort of people that in his lifetime gives him with more zeal a thousand benedictions, and labours for his glory with a more passionate will,

will, and such as shows that they have more of resentment against those that would do him any wrong. History may furnish us with a thousand strange and admirable examples of this affection of the vulgar people toward a good Prince; but, that I may not enlarge this discourse too much, we will content our selves to name only some of them. We see in *Sueton*, that after the death of *Germanicus*, a Prince of an eminent vertue, the Commonalty of *Rome* grew almost mad, that neither the Edicts of *Tiberius*, nor the Religion of certain *Festivals*, could stop the immoderate course of its grief, and that many of those which were possessed of this grief, went so far as to demolish the Altars of the gods through despair, to cast the tutelar gods of their houses into the streets, and to expose those children that were born to them on that day, as refusing all Happiness and all occasions of Joy. The good qualities of

*Julius Cæsar* produced also the like effects after his death; for though he had taken from the *Romans* that liberty which they prized so high; nevertheless after that *Antonie* had awakened by his Oration the memory of his Goodness, Clemency, Valour, and of the number of his Victories, the common people that heard him, were so touched with it, that after they had done honours to him as a god, they ran with lighted fire-brands in their hands to set fire to the *Capitol*, and had almost burnt down the City, to be revenged on those that had newly freed it, and reduced the Common-wealth to its antient form. This very *Cæsar* in his life-time was so beloved of his Souldiers, that having failed of their duty, they desired him to decimate them, thereby to expiate their crime, and to give himself satisfaction. The like happened also afterwards to his successor *Augustus*, according to the report of *Appian*. And *Alexander*

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*the Great*, leading his *Macedonian* Souldiers, young and old, croſs the deſerts, for none other deſign but to come to the bounds of the habitable world, was nevertheleſs ſo tenderly beloved of them, for his Vertue, that ſeeing them mutiny to return into *Macedonia*, and even the puniſhment of ſome of them could not ſtop their commotion, he only ſent them word, they might go whether they pleaſed, and that he would love them no longer, nor account them his, which touched them with ſo ſharp a Repentance, that flocking before his door, they fell a crying with abundance of tears, that he ſhould kill them if they had offended him, as *Quintus Curtius* tells the ſtory. But to begin our ſearch for the Reaſon, why the Vertue of a Prince excites in the minds of the common people (that are moſt commonly intereſſed and mercenary) ſuch diſintereſſed and ſuch heroick motions, which ſeem to be

greater then those that are raised in the rest of men that are better bred: is it not, in the first place, that the common people are not in all regards inferiour in Vertue to the rest of men; and that if they be something less generous and more mercenary, as we have confessed, they are on the other side full of Pitty, and have in very many things more of Shame and Justice? And may we not add, that as the love which *beasts* bear to their *young ones*, surpasses that which *men* bear to their *children*, it may very well be after the same manner that amongst men a good motion may sometimes be more strong where there is less of Reason and Knowledge, because then a man obeyes more blindly the good incitements of Nature? Or else is it that many times men of a middle rank look upon the Fortune of their Superiours, if not with envy properly so called, yet at least with some evil of heart; and that those of the lowest

loweſt ſort are more free from all theſe motions, becauſe the diſtance between them and thoſe that govern them is greater, and therefore they are diſpoſed the more to conſider their Vertue with Love and Admiration? Or elſe, is it that the motions of an heroick and extraordinary Generoſity, when they ſhine upon the eyes of all in the perſon of a Prince, may excite more of admiration in the minds of the loweſt ſort of people, becauſe they perceive themſelves leſs capable of ever ariſing ſo high? Or elſe is it that when a Prince manifeſts his affection in general to all his ſubjects, the loweſt people think themſelves *moſt obliged* to his goodneſs, becauſe they think themſelves *leaſt worthy* of it? Or elſe, is it not that the greateſt part of the goodneſs of a Prince conſiſts herein, to be favourable to the Poor, which, as being weakeſt, are moſt apt to be wronged by the ſtronger; not to enrich thoſe that are already

too rich, with the substance of the common people, and to do Justice equally to all his subjects, without having regard to the difference of quality, and that it is no wonder if all this doth more please the *common* sort of people, then persons of *quality*? Or else is it also that the vulgar sort as being less inlightned, and less pollished by Learning, are more dazled by greatness of Birth, and have more veneration from the pomp and glory that attends the fortune of Princes; so that when the lustre of Vertue comes to shine on their eyes, together with this glittering Greatness, it seems so venerable to them, that it hath power over their minds to do any thing? This last truly seems to contribute not a little to their Admiration; but, to conclude, we may see here by the way, that *Machiavel* had no reason to say that the Vertue of a Prince can raise Love and Gratitude in a few persons only, and that all the

rest

reſt of men are ingrateful, and incapeable of being moved by it, and therefore in his opinion, he ſhould endeavour rather to make himſelf feared by the rigour of his puniſhments: This appears, ſay I, to be falſe by our Problem, for we have ſeen that the love of a Princes Vertue ſhines chiefly in the common people, which makes the greateſt part of men, and is able to beget in them moſt exquiſite and admirable motions of affections, becauſe of this mixture with Greatneſs, which hath a certain Luſter and Beauty, that doth extreamly take with the people. And if I may be permitted to add ſomething upon this conſideration, I ſhall ſay further, that it is only the baſeneſs of his own mind, that made him imagine that Gratitude, ſhame of an unworthineſs generally confeſt, or love of a rare merit, ſhould have ſo little power upon our ſpirits; for it hath been often ſeen, that a troop of mutiners

from amongſt the very dregs of the people, after they have contemned the fear of puniſhment, have become calm and appeaſed on a ſudden, meerly by the preſence of a man of known vertue, out of reverence which it imprinted in them. There are many crimes which men ceaſe not to commit every day, although they that commit them are every day hanged for it; but on the contrary, there are ingratitudes and unworthineſſes which are committed but very rarely, although the Laws have not ordained any puniſhment for thoſe that are guilty of them, becauſe the greateſt part of men have conceptions lively enough of the blackneſs and ſordidneſs of them. The fear of Death and Pain, which, according to *Machiavel*, do never forſake men, is overcome every day in the wars by the hope of a little pay, and the contempt of them is grown common. But of ſo many thouſand men that hazzard themſelves

ſelves thus, without doubt there would be but a very few, that for a much greater ſumm would betray a friend, by whom they had been ſenſibly obliged. But we leave this diſcourſe, before it hath carried us very much beyond our ſubject, and paſs on to another Problem.

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## PROB. 43.

*What is the reaſon that Shame makes a redneſs to ariſe in the face?*

AS there are not any motions more pleaſant and more worthy to be known, then thoſe of *Shame*, ſo there are none that ſeem to produce their effects in us after ſo obſcure a manner, and ſo difficult to explain. The reaſon is, that whatever our mind doth moſt genuinely and after a more natural manner, is alwayes that which it is leaſt aware of. Now the impreſſions that Shame

causes in our blood, and upon our faces, is so natural, that Stage-players which laugh and cry, though they are neither sad nor merry, which can make themselves look pale as if they were afraid, and can artificially draw upon their faces the redness of Anger, and easily counterfeit Pitty, Astonishment, or Disdain, cannot for all this by any cunning draw upon their faces the redness of Shame, and the characters which it ought to be accompanied with. Besides, he that cryes hath an intention to cry, and he that weeps hath an intention to weep: but most commonly he that blushes hath no intention to blush, and this is the reason that very modest persons blush even at their very blushing, and by endeavouring to hide their Shame, increase and double it. Lastly, that which makes the difficulty of this Problem appear greater, is, that it is certain the redness of Shame proceeds always from some grief

and pain which the ſoul is in. Now it is the property of Grief to repreſs the blood and ſpirits, and gather them together about the heart, inſtead of ſpreading of them in the face, as ſhame doth. Nevertheleſs, we will endeavour here to diſcover the myſterie of ſo handſom a paſſion: And firſt we will tell you what ſome have thought, that the ſoul ſends forth the blood into the face in ſhame, becauſe it deſires to cover it as with a veil; whereto they endeavour to add ſome weight from experience, which ſhows us, that thoſe which are ſurprized with Shame, do naturally hold their hand before their face. Now as I do not abſolutely reject this conſideration of theirs, yet I do not think it ought to ſatisfie us ſo, but that we ſhould ſearch for others: For beſides that it is perhaps a pretty *fancy* rather than a *reaſon*, certain it is, that many times they that are ſurprized with Shame, do not deſire to hide their

faces

faces from him that censures them, but on the contrary do earnestly wish that he read therein his repentance and sorrow; and for all this cease not to blush. To search then another cause of this effect, we must in the first place consider, that in all the Passions, the *Soul* imprints the images of its least motions upon the *body*, and there figures out what it resents, and what it suffers by certain dispositions which it gives it, as it were by so many *Emblems* and *Metaphorical pictures*, whether it doth it out of design, or be constrained to it by necessity. Thus, for example, angry people hold up their heads high, and commonly set both their hands on their sides, because holding the head high and taking up more room then before, is a *Metaphorical* expression of the vain elevation of a presumptuous mind, and of the greatness which it falsly attributes to it self: So a man that affirms any thing with much zeal and opinionativeness,

onativeneſſe, commonly bends his fiſts, becauſe this action hath ſome Analogy and correſpondence with the eſtate in which the ſoul is. But it were unprofitable and endleſs to think to prove a thing ſo clear and certain, by enumerating all our paſſions; wherefore ſuppoſing it rather true, we ſay (and I think with much colour of Reaſon) that in all griefs and ſadneſſes, when the ſoul flyes ſome external evil, and conſiders it as external, it makes the ſpirits of the outward parts fly towards the inward, becauſe ſuch a motion as ſhews that it deſires from all ſides to enter into its ſelf, thereby to eſcape that evil which comes unto it from without, is moſt proper to repreſent to the life the deſire which it then hath, and the condition it is in: but on the contrary, in the grief of Shame, becauſe it is touched with the horrour and hatred of an evil, that is within it ſelf, and is faſtened to its own ſubſtance, ſince it is nothing

elſe

else but its own imperfection, it cannot better express this horrour and hatred, then by violently thrusting forth the blood and spirits from within to the outward parts, as if it would banish them from us, since that indeed it is an estate that hath some Analogy with this corporal motion, and that it would if it could, banish it self, and go out of its self, by that means to fly from the vice which it finds it is defiled with. Moreover *Shame* dilates the spirits and the blood, and sheds them upon the face more subtilly then any other passion, because it proceeds from a most spiritual conception, to wit, from the conception of a dishonest thing, and that the more spiritual impressions have also more quick and suddain effects. To this effusion of the blood and spirits, contributes also perhaps after another sort, the contempt which in shame the soul hath of its self; for seeing that then when it is most careful to preserve

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and defend us (as for example in Fear and in Affliction) it doth extraordinarily contract and keep them within, to ſtrengthen it ſelf the more; it may be, on the contrary, when it hates, and thinks it ſelf as it were unworthy of its own care, it doth by a natural motion remit much of that ſtraining, which holds the ſpirits thus united and collected, and gives them more liberty to ſpread themſelves, and to carry the blood along with them. But if this contribute nothing at all to it, the firſt reaſon that we give, is methinks ſufficient to clear this *Problem*; for though for the moſt part we do not bluſh, if we do not think our ſelves really in fault: yet ſometimes a calumny makes us bluſh; and ſome may wonder that it ſhould be ſo, ſince then the ſoul, one would think, can not be troubled with any remorſe nor with any ſenſe of its own imperfection. To this I anſwer, that in truth we cannot have a true remor-

of faults, which we have not committed; but as he which hath for ſome time held his eyes fixt upon a deep precipice, into which it is impoſſible he ſhould fall, yet cannot chooſe but tremble out of a vain ſhadow of fear that this image gives him: So he that hath great horrour for ſome fault which he is falſly accuſed of, according as he hath his mind bent upon the conſideration of the lewdneſs which is attributed to him, cannot chooſe, notwithſtanding the clear teſtimony of his own Conſcience and of Reaſon, but be ſurprized many times with a vain ſhadow of remorſe, which makes a bluſh mount into his face, ere his ſoul hath had time to think better on it.

PLOT.

## PROB. 44.

*What is the reason that when we blush, it appears especially in the fore-head?*

IS it not because the fore-head is the *whitest* part of the face, and most free from natural redness, and consequently most apt to make that more lively appear, which shame imprints in it? Or else the blood which shame brings into the face, doth it not appear chiefly in the fore-head, because the skin thereof is extreamly *thin* and *delicate*, as one may easily perceive by so many little wrinkles, which Horrour, Discontent, Admiration or Anger do make in it, and because it is free from *hair*, which in the other parts of the face may in some sort hinder us for perceiving so well the impressions which come into it from within? Or else,

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if the conceit of thoſe that ſay, that in ſhame the ſoul ſends the blood into the face to cover it therewith, as with a veil, muſt take place; may we not ſay, that it ſends it eſpecially into the fore-head, becauſe it is the part moſt *expoſed* to the *view* of of him that cenſures us: ſeeing that when we ſpeak to men, we are wont to look them in the fore-head: Or elſe do not the ſpirits in ſpreading themſelves, make the blood eſpecially come under the skin of the fore-head, for that it is the *higheſt* part of the face, and that it is their nature to *aſcend* as much as they can, as ſoon as the ſoul lets go her hold by which ſhe keeps them in the body?

PROB.

## Prob. 45.

*What is the reason that praises make a man blush?*

IS it not because he that is much commended, feels many times that the excess of praises which are given to him, do puff him up whether he will or no with a little pride, and tickle him with a pleasure that dissolves and as it were shakes all his gravity and firmness: So that he blushes not at the praises, but at the weakness he finds in himself and discovers to others? Truly that which shews that it may be thus, is, that we see those which are most subject to blush when they hear themselves praised, are commonly such persons as have indeed a sincere goodness, but have not a soul really great; for a great soul is not puft up nor elevated at the praises it receives, any more

more than the Sea is encreaſed or heightened by the water of Rivers that run into it. But it may be too all their redneſs proceeds not from *Shame*, but comes partly from an extream *pleaſure* they take to hear themſelves praiſed; for pleaſure alſo diffuſes the ſpirits and gives ſome colour to the face. Or elſe that on the one ſide, an honeſt and good ſoul hath not alwayes the courage, generouſly to reject the falſe praiſes that are given it, becauſe it loves glory; but that, on the other ſide, becauſe of its goodneſs, it bluſheth at the fault it commits in not reſiſting them, and in taking to it ſelf by this complacence an honour which is not its due. Or elſe, is it not out of extream *Humility* that a man bluſhes, in hearing himſelf praiſed for that he doth not at all believe that he is maſter of thoſe perfections which are attributed to him, and that the praiſes given him, ſhow him what he ought to be, and there-

fore

fore do only quicken the ſenſe which he hath of his imperfections? Or elſe, is it becauſe he that highly commends us, makes every one look on us the more, and doth in a manner draw us out of obſcurity by this glory which he procures us, and that then we bluſh not at our glory, but rather becauſe we apprehend that our faults will appear the more in this great light which it ſets us in, and that it doth as well illuſtrate our blemiſhes as our perfections, and renders them the more remarkable? Here poſſibly ſome may ſay to me, if the bluſhing of ſhame proceeds only from the ſenſe which we have of our imperfection, as you have eſtabliſhed it in another *Problem*, to what purpoſe is it that our faults are objected to us by others to make us bluſh, and what is the reaſon that it contributes thereto? I anſwer, that it is becauſe the judgement of others doth alwayes confirm ours, and therefore if we think that another

blames

blames and condemns a fault which we have committed, this belief of his doth more ſtrengthen the opinion which we had of it before, and doth more lively manifeſt the uglineſs of it.

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## Prob. 46.

*What is the reaſon that a man laughs more at a pleaſant jeſt, or a merry tale, when he himſelf that tells it, doth not laugh?*

IS it not becauſe then he doth not ſeem to have the deſign which he hath, I mean, that he ſeems as if he would tell ſomething ſerious and of importance, whereas he only tells ſome trifle, and that our mind takes pleaſure in this deceit? But why doth it take more delight in this *deceit*, then it would have done in ſeeing the naked *truth*? Is it not becauſe in diſcovering it thus through a lye,

lye, that is transparent and easily penetrable, it still somewhat exerciseth its noblest faculty, the judgement, and gives to it self some proof of its sufficiency and light? Or else is it because a ridiculous thing spoken in a cold and serious tone, *surprizeth* us the more, because we did not expect to see it in this form, and under this appearance, and so it is proper to cause *laughter*, which must arise from a being *surprized*, whereas he that laughs whilest he tells a merry story, doth as it were *threaten* us and give us *warning* before hand, so that he doth not *surprize* us at all? But why must laughter arise from a *surprize*? Is it, as some say, because it proceeds from *Admiration*, which is raised chiefly by a *novelty*? Or else, is it because that which makes us laugh, is alwayes so vain, that if our minds could consider it a little at leisure, it would not find in it any subject of contentment? Or else, do we not laugh, when he that tells

tells us any merry thing laughs much at it, because he seems to us as if he commended himself; and that otherwise that which he sayes, seems to be less pleasant, and less apt to cause laughter, when we see he helps it forward by beginning to laugh first? Or else lastly, is it because he which tells a merry passage without laughing, appears to have some politeness, and with all gravity of manners: So that as he appears a more honest man, so likewise whatever he saith, hath more of grace in his mouth, and delights us the more, whereas if he laughs too much, he appears only a *Boiffon*, and by this means whatever he saies, though never so good, loses more then half its grace and beauty?

PROB.

## PROB. 47.

*Why do we laugh in seeing a thing very ill-favoured, since that which delights the mind, one would think ought to have in it some perfection?*

TO escape this difficulty which is not so slight, but that many ancient Philosophers, and Orators have laboured to little purpose for the clearing of it: may we not say in the first place, that a man doth not laugh at ugly things, when they are wholly and altogether such, since that on the contrary we do then call them horrible, and fly from them as things odious; but that most commonly a man laughs at some trifling and slight grace mixt with their deformity? as for example, it is clear that the habit of a *Bouffon* though it be deformed, hath

many times I know not what grace that may tickle the imagination; But what is the reason this remnant of grace, and this vain and slight ray of goodness that may be found in some ill-favoured things, makes one laugh more then a thing reasonably well made would do? May it not possibly be because in a thing ill made, the defects that it hath, may by their opposition render in some sort more pleasant, and more grateful to the fancy, that little grace which shines in it? Or else rather, is it not because generally every grace or prettiness that makes one laugh, either in handsome or unhandsome things, should be alwayes vain and slight, and not solid, as we said in the foregoing *Problem*? But why should it be so? Is it not because solid graces chiefly affecting the *Judgement*, and approving themselves to us by our discretion and understanding, do produce a pleasure though *greater*, yet more *sober*,

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and ſuch as hath ſomething of *grace* in it; but a vain and ſlight grace, affecting eſpecially the *imagination*, and being chiefly liked by our weakneſs, fills us alſo with a joy that manifeſts ſomewhat of weakneſs and childiſhneſs, and takes from us all gravity, and makes us not able to hold our countenance, which is that we call laughter, and therefore they ſay it is a ſign of folly in thoſe that are much ſubject to it? Or elſe do not things that are very ill-favoured delight thoſe that look upon them becauſe they are *rare* as well as things perfect and excellent? Or elſe is it not that as our ſoul loves to have its *Ideas* perfect and intirely expreſſive of their objects, for this reaſon it is pleaſed more in conſidering things very ill done, then moderately well, becauſe theſe firſt do perfect and accompliſh the *Idea* which it hath of uglineſs, and fills up its knowledge to the full every way; whereas thoſe that are moderately

well done can give it only imperfect notions? Or elſe do not objects that are very ill done, by giving us an *Idea* of extream imperfection, furniſh us with an eaſie way to draw from thence the image of extream perfection, and to render it more lively in us; ſo that they very much inſtructing our mind, it delights it ſelf to conſider them, not for any reaſon that perſwades it that it ſhould do ſo, but by a natural and blind motion that makes it ſearch in it to perfect its knowledge, and to inſtruct its ſelf? Or elſe, do we not love to ſee things very ill done, to ſhew our abilities in condemning them? But what is the reaſon we cannot as well ſhow them in praiſing thoſe that are moderately well done? Is it not becauſe every body knows at firſt ſight that which is extream, and findes more difficulty in that which is moderate? Or becauſe, as we ſaid in another *Problem*, it is eaſier to blame then to commend?

Or

Or elſe, do we not delight to expreſs the rules of good, whereof we have all ſome *Theory*, rather on the ſubject of an ill made thing, then of one that is well made, becauſe a thing well made contains them in its ſelf, and ſo ſeems to ſuggeſt them to us, and to leave nothing to our invention, whereas when we expreſs them by blaming a deformed thing, we ſeem to invent them our ſelves? It is probable indeed that fools do it for this reaſon, becauſe they think they cannot manifeſt their wit better then by detracting and finding fault. Or elſe, to conclude, is it not in many meerly an odd fantaſtical and childiſh humour to like a thing that is deformed, and to conſider it with ſatisfaction, and therefore we ſee that all fools laugh more heartily at monſtrous and extravagant things, and that good and diſcreet men ſmiling only at theſe, do laugh more heartily at things excellent and handſome, as at a bold

and neat reply, at a pretty compendious way by which some one hath brought about his desires, or at some gentleness that shines in his actions, at a gracefull motion of the body, at the fit proportions and correspondence of all the parts of an History, or Fable, at a passion naturally expresst, or some such like thing?

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PROB. 48.

*What is the reason that Man being inclined to flatter himself, doth nevertheless aggravate his own imperfection above the truth; as for example, in saying there is nothing but folly, and injustice, and ingratitude in the world?*

FIrst, it may be said on this subject, that in truth man attains most commonly to a mediocrity of *wisdome*, seeing there are scarce any

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that have not the uſe of common ſence; and that to ſpeak civilly, he alſo attains ordinarily to a moderate and common *Virtue*, ſeeing there are few that become unnatural: but that for all this, when we come to compare this wiſdome, and this ordinary virtue of men with a ſtate of *Perfection* much greater, which reaſon gives us the *Idea* of, we finde our ſelves forced to name them *Vice* and *Folly*, juſt as we call foul linnen black, in comparing it with that which hath been new waſhed, or with ſnow, though it be white in it ſelf and in compariſon with Ink; for every mean ſtate is an evil in regard of an excellency which is much above it as truly as it is a good, in regard of that which is beneath it. Now our ſoul is ſo much the more apt to look upon the good that is in it with diſdain, becauſe it finds it is born for a ſtate of perfection much more eminent; and thus though an *Artiſan* be to be com-

mended if he perfectly understand any mechanick art; yet wheen we judge of a *Prince*, we make no account of such an ability, if he hath no other, because we conceive he is born for much greater things. Secondly, our soul doth often attribute to it self more imperfection then it hath, because the good already gotten slips out of our memory, and doth not ordinarily present it self to our minds, as that which is wanting doth; the reason of it is, because the soul alwayes withdraws its sight from the things about which it hath no more to do, as on the contrary, it fixeth it upon those that give it some occasion of desire and endeavour. In the third place, a man doth not think there is any need of aggravating the *good* that is in man, and believes rather it would be a thing very hurtful: but on the contrary, he thinks it is very profitable to aggravate his *Vice* and *Folly*, which is also very true, but yet to some

some certain degrees only; for to give to man too low conceptions of himself, and such as are like him, is an abating of his Courage and quenching of his Emulation. But however hereby, sometimes the imperfection of man seems to us to be greater then it is; for to consider, first, that which regards his *understanding*, oftentimes when we speak of many fools, we say with a serious tone, as if we desired to be believed, and to have it pass for an *Axiome*, that they have no more judgement then beasts; nay in aggravating their folly, we think sometimes that beasts have more: though if we consider it aright and according to the truth of the business, a man that is the most void of wit, gives, at but opening his eyes, and by his first gestures, and by his first looks, tokens of a greater judgement then all beasts put together: There are also Philosophers that have contributed to the making of the generality of men be

so severely condemned; for whether it were, that herein they alwayes had for their end some profit that might be reaped by it, or that at sometimes they might be put upon it for some other reasons, they have one after another aggravated his folly in such a manner as if they had a minde to take from him even common sense. In this there is too much severity and bitterness; for we should not consider only the *faults* of people, but also the *good* that is in them, and then we shall finde that in many things they have the first notions most quick and most pure, though they know not how to discourse of them exactly, and after a subtile manner: we should not also impute as so many *faults* of their *understanding*, all the *weaknesses* of their *imagination*, and take them in the worst sense that can be; for all things appear bad to him that considers them not with *candor* and *equity*; and he that is resolved never

ver to see any thing but bad, makes short work, by casting himself into an excess of rigour, and turning away his eyes from that which is laudable in them; but by this means he depraves himself, and not that which he considers after this manner; the same also happens from the aggravating of mens vice. But to discover yet another cause that makes us thus defame our nature many times beyond the truth, it may further be said, that every one thinks to gain something to his own advantage in vilifying mankind, and the generality of men; for if he hath any perfection, he is more willing to perswade himself, that it comes to him from what he hath *particular* and proper, then to believe that it proceeds from what he hath in *common* with others; the reason whereof is, because what he hath in particular, is more his own; and on the contrary if he hath any imperfection, he also findes some comfort

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in the diſpleaſure it doth him, by attributing it to the general nature of man, rather then to the fault of his own individual nature: But eſpecially wicked men are put upon a like deſign by the like motive; for, that they may finde out ſome excuſe, they endeavour to include all others in the ſame fault, which they themſelves are guilty of: they ſcrape together therefore what ever is moſt ugly in our life, and make it much worſe in expreſſing it, and in giving ill interpretations of it; and when we hear them thus aggravate much beyond the truth that which is ill in us, we contradict them not, as well becauſe as I told you, that we think it is *profitable* it ſhould be ſo, as alſo becauſe it ſeems to be *Humility* to conſent to an accuſation in which we are comprized; and on the contrary that it is *arrogance* and *preſumption* to oppoſe it. From hence then ariſe many ſayings and expreſſions, which import that reaſon

ſon can do nothing or very little on the mind of man, that there is; nothing but injuſtice and ingratitude to be ſeen in the world, and ſuch other like things, which are contrary to other ſayings that we have at other times, which are as much beyond the truth: for it is not more impoſſible that heaven ſhould fall, then it is impoſſible that Juſtice and Reaſon ſhould ceaſe to have very much power upon the minds of men, and that they ſhould not ſuffer themſelves to be bent and affected with this ſame Reaſon, as their particular intereſt. Pirats, robbers upon the high-way, poyſoners, and the moſt deteſtable of men, do not make any exception againſt this rule; and though Choler be the moſt wild and ſavage of all our paſſions, and though it ſtir whatſoever is moſt baſe and evil in us; yet that which firſt kindles it is an indignity, which is nothing elſe but injuſtice: and therefore Poets that

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are the Painters of the ordinary motions of the ſoul, when they bring upon the ſtage one that talking to himſelf alone labours to animate himſelf with a violent rage, they make him inſiſt longer upon reaſons drawn from juſtice or injuſtice, then upon others drawn from profit; and not without cauſe, for if a man do only conclude in himſelf, that it is profitable for him to be angry, there would be nothing more cold then ſuch an inticement, and he would not for this obtain of himſelf to be angry in good earneſt; but if he be perſwaded that it is juſt he ſhould be ſo, this conſideration would without fail put fire into his ſoul as ſoon as ever he thinks of it, and will there kindle the flames of choler: Hence it comes that a thief, what want ſo ever he have of money, will not be angry that a man hath been ſo careful as not to let him cut his purſe; for he cannot ſee in this any indignity, and he doth abſolutely want

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the conſiderations of juſtice, which ought to begin the forming of choler in him. And as for the common ſayings by which we expreſs the want of gratitude, which we ordinarily ſee in men, they alſo do often ſurpaſs the truth; for if we conſider it well, there is nothing more preſſing than a motion of gratitude, and experience ſhews ſufficient examples of it amongſt all ſorts of men. But to leave this diſcourſe, I will add, that becauſe there are few ſpirits ſo miſerable, as to endeavour to make themſelves more wicked then they are: Man, for that reaſon, knows not how inacceſſible the extremity of vice is, and how impoſſible it would be for him to diſpoile himſelf of what ever there is good and laudable in his nature, and to go quite contrary to the rules of Reaſon; and that this makes him ſometimes have too ill an opinion of himſelf, and to paſs beyond the bounds of truth in blaming himſelf.

PROB.

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the conſiderations of juſtice, which ought to begin the forming of choler in him. And as for the common ſayings by which we expreſs the want of gratitude, which we ordinarily ſee in men, they alſo do often ſurpaſs the truth; for if we conſider it well, there is nothing more preſſing than a motion of gratitude, and experience ſhews ſufficient examples of it amongſt all ſorts of men. But to leave this diſcourſe, I will add, that becauſe there are few ſpirits ſo miſerable, as to endeavour to make themſelves more wicked then they are: Man, for that reaſon, knows not how inacceſſible the extremity of vice is, and how impoſſible it would be for him to diſpoile himſelf of what ever there is good and laudable in his nature, and to go quite contrary to the rules of Reaſon; and that this makes him ſometimes have too ill an opinion of himſelf, and to paſs beyond the bounds of truth in blaming himſelf.

PROB. 49.

*What is the reason that according to the common saying of the Poets and of Aristotle himself in the second book of his Politicks, Valiant and couragious persons are most subject to love?*

IS it not because courage and an inclination to Love have one and the same Original in the Temperament, namely heat of blood, which may be perceived in that the age wherein man is most couragious through the heat of his blood, is that wherein he is most inclined to Love? Or else, is it not because Love is a passion which hath some beauty and nobleness, and that men truly couragious, as they have a more noble soul, so have they also a greater propension to all the Passions that have any ray of nobleness and beauty,

and

and proceed partly from a good principle? Indeed we see, that for this reason they are subject to ambition, because ambition hath some mixture of generosity, and of the Love of that which is honest; and to Opinionativeness, because it hath a shadow of constancy; but that on the contrary they are farther then other men from Avarice, Cruelty, and desire of Revenge, because these motions of the soul have not the least footsteps of any nobleness and beauty. Now to shew that Love is a passion which hath some nobleness and something of praise-worthy, we may bring this reason, that (whatsoever some say that would decide this business by fine expressions, and have their jests pass for Oracles) a true Lover doth in some sort love beauty for it self, and not only for the hope of a base and brutish pleasure; for he not only humbles himself before the beloved object, as we humble our selves before a great man by constraint,

ſtraint, and with repugnance, and to obtain ſome good of him, but he alſo takes pleaſure in this very act of ſubmiſſion, and the more he humbles himſelf with innocence and freeneſs, and without any deſign, the more this pleaſure increaſes in him, which is an infallible token that he makes this the end of part of his deſire: Juſtly therefore do the Poets call the exceſs of Love *handſome fooleries*; for though they be *fooleries* in that they chooſe their objects ill, they have ſome *Beauty* in that they denote in the ſoul where they are formed, ſome violent inclination to love *perfection*. Or elſe may we ſay, that even the inclination to love perfection is the ſole motive and only fountain of true courage, ſo that if Love have in it any ray or ſpark thereof, it is no wonder that thoſe who have an extream high courage, are the more ſubject to it? Or elſe is it that it is an hard matter to reſiſt at once two contrary aſſaults, becauſe this ſeems

to

to require two contrary dispositions of mind; and that for this reason they that have a soul strong to resist griefs and objects of terrour, are many times extraordinary weak against pleasures and objects that conquer by flattering our senses, amongst which those that cause Love are the most alluring? Certainly, it seems credible, when we consider the great weakness with which men, the most famous for their courage, have yeilded to pleasures of this kind. Nevertheless, herein their courage was imperfect; for our soul ought not to be firme like *Ice* very hard frozen, which resisting the blows of hatchets, and bearing heavy burdens, yet makes less resistance to a small heat, and to a ray of the Sun, then the most weak things; but rather like to a *Diamant* which equally resists all assaults: and as a sword cuts alike on both sides, so a perfect and compleat courage should be whetted on both sides, and have as it were two edges.

edges and two points to reſiſt equally *Pleaſures* and *Pains*; Or elſe, theſe two different parts of courage, which we now ſpeak of, have not at all any thing of contrary, and do ſpring rather from the ſame fountain: but as though the Viſual faculty hath one and the ſame ſpring, yet when we would collect it into one of the eyes, and there make it become more ſtrong, we do naturally ſhut the other: ſo our ſoul in uniting all its force towards ſome one ſide, remits in it other regards, and in avoiding with great care ſome kind of weakneſs, it falls more readily into others.

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## PROB. 50.

*Whence comes that averſion to marriage of perſons too near?*

AS there is no queſtion but the condemning of Marriage between

tween persons too near, is less clear by reason, then the condemning of vices, which are formally the motions of malice: so he that would infer from thence, that there is nothing of *nature* in this, and that it is wholly a *Civil* constitution, and no more, will be deceived; since that the general inclination and opinion of men testifies the contrary; for a general opinion can never fail of being true, at least in part; and the example of beasts cannot upon this subject be considerable to a man of judgement; for it were absurd to think that beasts should respect an affinity which they know not; and he that should say that laughter, shame, desire of glory, desire of knowledge and the like, are not natural to *Man*, because they are not natural to *beasts*, would evidently make a ridiculous consequence. And if men cannot give particular reasons why they disapprove this sort of marriages, and specifie what they

finde

finde inconvenient therein according to reaſon, we ought to think that for all that they ſee it in *groſs* and at a *diſtance*, as many times we ſee afar off an *houſe*, though we be not able to diſtinguiſh the *dores*, *windows*, and other parts of it. And by how much the leſs clear the reaſons of it are, ſo much the more reaſon have we to exerciſe our ſelves in the diſcovery of them in this *Problem*. *Firſt* then I ſhall ſay, that not only nature gives us a ſtrong inclination to love thoſe perſons which are very near us, and are members of the ſame family with us, (for of this no man that hath his ſenſes can doubt) but that it alſo makes us conſider them in ſome manner as we do our ſelves: This appears in that if a man commends one that is very near us, we bluſh at it as if he commended us, and do out of humility deſire him to forbear, as if theſe praiſes were meant to us. This being ſo, as every one is naturally far from the folly into which

*Narciſſus*

*Narciſſus* fell, and is not capable of being touched with the love of his own beauty: by the ſame reaſon he naturally flyes from regarding with Paſſions like to thoſe of Lovers, the perſons for whom he hath an affection of the ſame nature and kind with that which he hath for himſelf; and this is a token of the ardour and truth of the Amity which he bears them; as on the contrary, if this Amity ſhould ceaſe to have the qualities and properties of that which he bears to himſelf, it were a certain ſign that it had received diminution, and is not ſuch as nature requires it ſhould be. In the *ſecond* place, the reverence which Proximity gives to perſons that are of the ſame family, being an obligation ſo ſtraight and ſo natural, that the ancient *Romans* have named it *Piety*, and that every honeſt ſoul conſiders it as a *ſacred* thing; it proceeds from hence that a man deſires to ſee the degrees of it very diſtinct, and ſeparate, in ſeveral perſons,

persons, to the end that it may the more exactly discharge the duties that belong unto it, and discern more clearly after what manner he ought to be affected towards each of them in particular; for he perceives that this knowledge would become much more obscure by marriages that should unite in one and the same person *two* of these degrees first, and afterwards *three* or *four* or more of them; and that in this case there would be requisite much subtilty of wit to discern the obligation that should arise from the mixture of these different or contrary obligations. If besides these general reasons we shall need to alledge others, touching the different degrees of Proximity, first, to shew that reason prohibits marriage with those men or women that are of our nearest kindred to whom we owe respect, I shall alledge those well-known verses, whose truth every one will confess,

*Non bene conveniunt nec in unâ ſede moranturr*
*Majeſtas & Amor.* That is,

*A real Love and Majeſty,*
*Can hardly in one boſom lie.*

Whereupon I add, that if Reaſon forbids us to uſe too familiar *careſſes* towards thoſe perſons I ſpake of, it doth likewiſe forbid us to deſire to unite our ſelves to them in ſuch a manner of union as above all others produces Familiarity, and doth neceſſarily deface and aboliſh Reſpect and Inequality: I mean that Union wherein marriage conſiſts. It remains then only to ſpeak of that marriage which may be imagined between *Brother* and *Siſter*, in regard of which the preceding reaſon can have no place, ſeeing they owe one another no *Reſpect*, but meerly *Amity*. It is well known what a great Perſonage diſcourſing on this ſub-

ject, hath ſaid, to wit, that the affection which would ariſe from ſuch a marriage, as being produced from the concourſe of two ſuch potent conſiderations, would be ſomewhat too ardent. But, for my part, I do not think he ſhould have taken it thus, nay I conceive, that in ſome ſort it ought to have been taken quite contrary. But before I explain my ſelf more clearly, I will ſay that in every *ſpecies* of the Paſſions, there are of them that are contrary to one another, and that expell one another, and are incompatible, inſtead of increaſing and mutually aſſiſting each other. Thus, for example, there are contrary *Joyes*; for there is a certain *Brutiſh Joy*, which is ſo incompatible with another *Spiritual Joy*, that when this laſt poſſeſſes the ſoul, the other muſt neceſſarily give place; and hence it comes to paſs that many that feel within themſelves moſt perfect pleaſures, and ſuch as are very ſpiritual, have in their

countenance an ayr of ſadneſs, very far from having their eyes cheerful, and thoſe other marks that accompany lower and baſer pleaſures. Thus a *ſadneſs* that raiſes in a man a diſcourſe which he intends to make upon Humane vanities and miſery, being very far from encreaſing that which the loſs of a ſuit at Law, or the like, hath begotten in him, diminiſhes it, and inſtead of overcharging his ſpirit, comforts it: Thus *Grief* for a *diſgrace* far from augmenting the weakneſs into which our ſoul is caſt through a corporal grief, ſerves many times to take from her the ſenſe of it. In a word, it were eaſie to ſhew, that there are alſo thus *Angers*, *Fears*, *Loves*, Enemies, as I may ſo ſay, one to another, and incompatible. This being thus premiſed, I ſay, that the Paſſion which we properly call *Love*, as ariſing from a *bodily* pleaſure, and being altogether *ſportful* and *wanton*, and an enemy to all *ſerious* thoughts

and conſiderations, according to the ſaying of Poets and of Lovers themſelves, cannot but be of a nature more contrary to *Fraternal Love*, which is altogether *Spiritual*, *Holy*, and *Serious*, and flows only from *Reaſon*. That for this cauſe ſo far are they from encreaſing one another, it is certain that That muſt neceſſarily looſen all the bonds of This, and that as we perceive that it looſens them, and that we have a very great inclination to keep them ſtill faſt and united, and ſuch as nature would have them to be, we feel alſo for this cauſe a repugnance, by reaſon of that which thus looſens them. And herein we do for all the world, as if a man ſhould go about to make us laugh heartily, by making ſome ſerious and profound contemplation of Philoſophie to encreaſe the pleaſure of it; for we ſhould ſoon perceive that quite contrary theſe two ſorts of Joy cannot agree together, much leſs augment one another;

another; and that it were an extravigance to think they ſhould. This is all I have to ſay upon this ſubject.

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## PROB 51.

*Whence proceed the exceſſive heats of the Moneth of* Auguſt, *and the other effects which are attributed to the Dog-ſtar?*

I Have much reaſon to fear that I ſhall be accounted raſh, if I dare to queſtion the power which is generally granted to the *Dog-ſtar*: but on the other ſide alſo, I conceive that if herein I am raſh, I ought to be pardoned, in conſideration that I undertake by this means to maintain familiar and *known* cauſes againſt *occult ones*; For as in *Law*, the cauſe of *Liberty* againſt *Servitude* is alwayes favourable, I conceive likewiſe that in diſputes of *Philoſophie*,

the reaſons which are drawn from *known* and *familiar* things, ought to be favoured againſt all thoſe that conſiſt in *Sympathie*, or in *ſecret influence*, or in *ſpecifick* qualities, and yet no doubt we ought to have recourſe to theſe laſt: but it is only as people that are like to be drowned, catch at thorns, and embrace them in that preſſing need: that is to ſay, when we find no other means to deliver our ſelves from a difficulty: for ſo long as there is any other means of eſcaping it, if it be but any thing tolerable, this muſt needs be very bad. But to come to the preſent buſineſs, Thoſe which have conſidered that the heat of the Moneth of *Auguſt* is greater then that of the Moneths of *June* and *July*, although in them the Sun be nearer to us, and ſtrikes us with leſs oblique rayes, and makes longer dayes, have thence inferred, that this exceſs of heat proceeds from the influence of a Star which is called the *Dog*, to which they

they have also given other ill qualities: for this (if we will believe what they say of it) is the cause that in *August* the heat of the Sun is more malignant, even when it is no greater then in the other Moneths of Summer; that many creatures, and especially Dogs, do then run mad; and that it is then more dangerous to go into the water; and that sicknesses are more frequent and greater; and that men feel some particular weaknesses in all the parts of the body. But all things well considered, it will be found, that there is nothing in all this that should oblige us to attribute secret and particular vertues to the Dog-star, and to leave the large field of known and ordinary causes. For first I do not see why we should wonder, that the Sun is hotter in *August* then in *July*, though it be true that in *August* he regards us somewhat more obliquely, and that the dayes are shorter, the reason of

it is, because the Earth having been exceedingly dryed by the former heats, is more apt to be violently scorched, as we see that any dry thing set before a lesser fire, receives a more violent heat, then a thing that is moist from a fire that is much greater. That this reason is pertinent, there is an experience that methinks proves it plainly enough; it is, that though at noon the Sun be nearer to us, and cast more direct rayes on us then he doth any time after: yet those that travel in Summer, do perceive a more violent heat two or three hours after-noon, then at noon it self; the reason whereof is, that at noon the moisture of the morning is not so well dryed up, either on the grass, or the air, or the earth, as it is a while after. This example is so put to the subject I apply it to, the Question in hand, that there cannot be found any difference in it, and it may serve well enough to prove what I say; for as somebody

hath

hath well obſerved, the images of the *Four Seaſons* of the year, are to be ſeen in one only Day, in which the *Morning* by its moiſture repreſents the *Spring*: *Noon* and ſometime after is like the *Summer Solſtice*, and the two Moneths that follow it; the *Evening* to the *Autum*: and the arrival of *Night* to the arrival of *Winter*. Now as this reaſon renders the heat of *Auguſt* greater, it is manifeſt that withall it renders it neceſſarily more malign. But yet if it be objected that it is often more malignant then that of other Moneths, without being more violent: I anſwer, that this doth not yet force us to fly to a ſecret cauſe; for if it were neceſſary to attribute this particular malignity to the influence of ſome Star, it would follow alſo, that we muſt give influences to ſome other Star, for to render a reaſon of the particular malignity of the Sun in *March*, which as having a very feeble heat, one would think, ſhould

not

not be able to be hurtful, and to engender ſo eaſily rhumes and catarrhs. But, to ſay the truth, theſe two ſeveral malignities are the effects only of the courſe of the year, and of two contrary extreams; for the *Sun* in *March* hath ſomething of malign and dangerous, by reaſon of the great humidity it meets with in the earth, nay and in our brain, on which it acts ſo weakly, that inſtead of diſſolving, it only dilates it. And on the contrary, the Sun in *Auguſt* is extraordinary hurtful through an exceſs of dryneſs which it finds in the earth, after it hath endured the heats of a great part of Summer, and in our bodies, which the ſame heats have dryed. It is this dryneſs which at this time diſpoſes beaſts to madneſs, though indeed Dogs run mad not only in *Auguſt*, but alſo very often in the Moneths of *June* and *July*, or *September*, which need not for this borrow any thing of the *Dog-ſtar*. From this exceſſive dry-

neſſe

neſſe proceeds likewiſe the weakneſs which we feel then in our bodies, and the diſpoſition which this ſeaſon puts us in, to divers maladies; for every extream is alwayes nigh an evil, and eaſily falls into one, or rather is one it ſelf: To conclude, if thoſe that ſwim in this Moneth, do find that the waters are more unwholſom then they were before, a man may ſay, it is becauſe their more *pure* and *ſubtile* parts have been exhaled by the precedent heats, and that what remains is *groſs* and *impure*. And I do not ſee that there is any thing in this, we ſhould need to attribute to the *Dog-ſtar*, more then in the other things we mentioned.

THE END.